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CHILD CUSTODY IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM

Leonard G. Ratner*
the most difficult of judicial functions is the determination of a child's custody after its parents have separated. The
difficulties are acute enough when all the parties remain in the
same place; when the parties are in different states, an additional
perplexing problem arises as to which state should have authority
to make the custody decision. This broad question can be resolved
into three distinct though interrelated issues: (1) what state may
initially determine custody; (2) what state may later modify that
determination; (3) to what extent is such a determination binding
on other states.
The Constitution allocates judicial authority among the several
states primarily through the due process and the full faith and
credit clauses. In recent years due process requirements for
the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts, as delineated by the
Supreme Court, have been concerned not so much with the presence of the parties or the subject matter of the litigation within
the territory of the state, as with the fairness to both parties of the
place of trial. 1 The full faith and credit directive has functioned
to inhibit relitigation of matters once decided and to maintain
federal unity through nationwide recognition and enforcement of
state judgments.2
Distinctive aspects of child custody litigation, however, make
the application of these constitutional policies more troublesome
in such cases than in suits for money or other property. Custody
adjudications always involve the interests of at least three persons;
the child, although not formally a party, is vitally affected by the
outcome. Pertinent evidence is usually most accessible in the locality of the child's home, and courts frequently use field investigators
to unearth it. Custody decrees are modifiable on the basis of a subsequent change in circumstances and in some states on the basis
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1 Sec EHRENZWEIG, CONFUcr OF LAws, pt. 1, at 88 (1959); Symposium, Jurisdiction;
Current Problems and Legislative Trends, 44 IowA L. REv. 247 (1959); The Supreme

Court, the Due Process Clause, and In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts: From
Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569 (1958).
2 Sec Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1945); articles collected in CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD & REEsE,
CONFUCT OF LAWS 250 (1957).
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of prior but unconsidered events as well.3 If the child has left the
state issuing the decree, the prevailing parent may have to seek enforcement in the state where the child is physically present. The
natural desire for prolonged custody or the acrimony arising from
the separation may result in frequent attempts by either parent to
place the child out of reach of the other and in repeated litigation.
As a result there is little agreement as to the proper basis for
allocation of custody jurisdiction and the extraterritorial effect of
a valid decree. 4 The courts have not yet articulated a principle
upon which to base workable, jurisdictional rules that satisfy com•
munity needs, although such a principle can be derived from those
needs.
THE STATE COURT DECISIONS

In some state court cases the legal presence of the defendant
provides the basis for initial custody jurisdiction5 in accordance
with the rule of Pennoyer v. N eff6 that a state may exercise authority
to decide a case without infringing due process of law when the
defendant is domiciled, resident, or personally served there. 7
But Pennoyer v. Neff also recognizes jurisdiction based upon
the presence of a disputed "res," and most courts, as well as the
first Restatement,8 allocate initial custody jurisdiction to the state
of the child's domicile when proceedings are begun, regarding the
status of the child as a "res" there present.9 Since the choice of a
home, generally the prime ingredient of domicile, cannot ordinarily
be made by a child, the domicile of one of the parents is usually
controlling after the separation.10 Many states consider the child
s See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Sampsell v. Superior
Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948); REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLicr OF LAws
§ 117(b) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).
4 See Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7 (1949); 53 HAR.v. L. REv.
1024 (1940); 80 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 712 (1932).
5 See cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 440 n.17 (1950); cf. De La Montanya
v. De La Montanya, 112 Cal. 100 (1896). See also Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d
763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
6 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
7 A defendant may also consent to the personal jurisdiction of a court, -usually by
appearing without objection to jurisdiction, and in some circumstances citizenship may
provide the basis for such jurisdiction. See EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 89;
GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 195-99 (3d ed. 1949). Adequate notice to the defendant is
assumed.
8 REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 117, 145 (1934).
9 See cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 439 n.15, 442 (1950). See also EHRENzWEIG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 275; GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 421.
10 See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 60, 83, 90; REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLicr
OF LAws §§ 9, 15, 30, 32 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). The Restatement says that "domicile
is the place, generally the home, which the law assigns a person for certain legal pur-
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to be domiciled with its father; 11 the Restatement prefers the
domicile of the parent with whom the child is living. 12 A number
of cases, in effect treating the child as the "res," assign custody
jurisdiction to the state where the child is physically present, because that state has immediate access to the child and an interest
in its welfare. 13
These rules are not mutually exclusive. Some states have not
found it necessary to choose between them and accept jurisdiction
on the basis of any of the three. 14 In Sampsell v. Superior Court 15
the Supreme Court of California declared that two or more states
have concurrent custody jurisdiction when the child's domicile,
the child, and the defendant are not in the same place, but that
one state may abstain in favor of another with a greater interest
in the child. The tentative Second Restatement has adopted this
position. 16
The same spectrum of rules is displayed by the state cases dealing with jurisdiction to modify custody decrees, 17 but other factors
also provide a basis for the exercise of such authority. Continuing
jurisdiction to modify may sometimes be asserted by the court that
made the initial decree, 18 and many courts infer jurisdiction to
poses." Id. § 9. The meaning of the concept varies with the problems to which it is
relevant, such as jurisdiction of a court, the authority of a state to tax, the right of an
individual to vote, the proper place for probate. See CooK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF
CONFLICT OF LAws 194-210 (1942); Reese, Does Domicile Bear a Single Meaning?, 55
CoLUM. L. REv. 589 (1955).
11 See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 90-92; SroMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 42
(lid ed. 1963).
12 REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 32 (1934); see REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT
OF LAws § 32 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). After a valid custody decree the child takes the
domicile of the prevailing parent. See GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 421-22; STUMBERG,
op. cit. supra note II, at 42.
18 See cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 440 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 16
(1949). See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND}, CONFLICT OF LAWS§ ll7 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957);
Gillman v. Morgan, 158 Fla. 605, 29 So. 2d 372 (1947); Kovacs v. Brewer, 245 N.C. 630,
97 S.E.2d 946 (1957).
14 Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 769, 197 P.2d 739, 743-44 (1948) and
cases cited therein; see Stansbury, Custody and .Maintenance Across State Lines, 10 LAw
&: CoNTEMP. PRon. 819 (1944). Compare domicile jurisdictions collected in Annot., 9
A.L.R.2d 434, 442 (1950), physical presence jurisdictions collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7,
16 (1949), and in personam jurisdictions collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 440 n.17
(1950).
111 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948), opinion by Traynor, J. See text accompanying note 139 infra.
10 REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § ll7 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).
17 See cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 453-57 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7,
32-35, 41-64, 85-95 (1949).
18 See cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 457-58 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7,
35-41 (1949); GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 423-24; Stansbury, supra note 14, at 825,
8!12.
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modify an out-of-state decree from jurisdiction to enforce it.10
Interstate recognition of valid foreign custody decrees is correspondingly variable. Most states extend full faith and credit or
comity to such decrees by enforcing them without relitigating the
issues and by considering modification, if requested, only on the
basis of subsequent events or prior events not presented to the initial court.20 But some courts deny full faith and credit to such decrees in proceedings to enforce or modify them, by readjudicating
the previously litigated facts.21 The state where the child is physically present often asserts a predominant interest in the child's
welfare as justification for such relitigation,22 and under the Sampsell concurrent jurisdiction rule a state with authority to determine custody is expected to give "respectful consideration" to a
valid prior decree but remains free to relitigate the entire matter.23
A manifest weakness of the "no full faith and credit" view is
avoided by the courts that enforce foreign custody decrees without
relitigation or modification when the losing parent holds the child
in defiance of the decree and thus lacks "clean hands." 24 Many of
these courts, however, improvising a further variation on the
theme, allow a winner who has brought the child into the jurisdiction in violation of the loser's visitation rights, to relitigate a subsequent modification by the initial forum giving the loser custody.20
THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

The foregoing medley of discordant decisions provides neither
a consistent set of rules nor an intelligible guide for those who
See cases collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 41-42, 43-47, 93-95 (1949).
See cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 454-57 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d
7, 41-42, 54 (1949); Annot., 160 A.L.R. 400 (1946); Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1299 (1938); Annot.,
72 A.L.R. 441 (1931); Annot., 20 A.L.R. 815 (1922). See GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 422-23; STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 11, at 322; R:EsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 147 (1934); cf. EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 281-93; Stansbury, supra note 14, at
828; R:EsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 117 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).
21 See cases collected in EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note I, at 284-85; Stansbury,
supra note 14, at 829 n.75; Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 11 n.2 (1949). A number of cases that
permit relitigation of issues previously decided do so on the ground that the previous
court lacked jurisdiction to make the decree. See cases collected id. at 64-78. None of
these cases hold that full faith and credit may be denied a valid foreign custody decree.
Cf. EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 283.
22 See cases cited note 21 supra.
23 Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 779, 197 P.2d 739, 750 (1948). See
Stansbury, supra note 14, at 830-31; R:EsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 117
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).
24 See cases collected in EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 286-90; Annot., 4
A.L.R.2d 7, 48 (1949); Annot., 107 A.L.R. 642 (1937).
25 See cases collected in EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 291.
19

20
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must resort to institutional settlement of custody disputes. Since
the issues presented arise under the federal constitution, only the
Supreme Court can authoritatively resolve them. That Court has
dealt with the interstate child custody problem in four cases, and
it seems safe to say that they have not abated the dissonance.

The Assumptions of Halvey
In New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey 26 the Court declined an
opportunity to clarify some of the basic problems of multi-state
custody jurisdiction and in the exercise of judicial restraint decided to decide as little as possible. In that case the mother took
the child from the family home in New York to Florida and after
about a year27 filed suit there for divorce and custody. The father
served by publication, did not answer but took the child back to
New York the d~y before entry of a default decree in favor of the
mother. 28 When she claimed the child by habeas corpus, the New
York courts modified the Florida decree by giving the father visitation rights and possession of the child during vacations.29
The Supreme Court assumed that Florida had initial custody
jurisdiction, refused to consider the effect of the full faith and
credit clause on custody decrees, and purported to decide only
that since Florida law permitted modification on the basis of facts
not previously evaluated, New York did not offend full faith and
credit by modifying on the basis of the father's evidence, which
had not been presented to the Florida court because he did not
appear there.
But Halvey may have decided more by implication than by
explication. The holding that full faith and credit could not prevent New York from modifying in accordance with Florida law
implies that New York had due process jurisdiction to modify the
decree. 30 The Court, however, said nothing specific about jurisdiction to modify except the following: "In this case the New York
court, having the child and both parents before it, had a full hearing and determined that the welfare of the child and the interests
of the father warranted a modification of the custody decree." 31
This sentence suggests that the presence of both parents and the
330 U.S. 610 (1947).
See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 185 Misc. 52, 55 N.Y.S. 761 (1945).
See note 61 infra.
The New York decree also required a $5,000 bond from the wife to insure com,
pliance. 330 U.S. 610, 612 (1947).
so See quotation in text accompanying note 170 infra.
31 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947).
20
27
28
29
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child before the New York court gave it modification jurisdiction.
But the conclusion is not obvious.
If, after abducting the child, the father had initiated proceedings in New York to modify the Florida decree with service upon
the mother in Florida, would the New York court then have had
jurisdiction to modify the Florida decree on grounds permitted by
Florida law? The opinion does not answer this question, but if the
answer is no, 32 should the mother be in a worse position because
she must ask for habeas corpus in New York to enforce the Florida
decree? True, she invokes the authority of the New York court, but
to enforce, not to alter, a valid decree. Can New York compel her
to submit to a modification of the decree as a condition to enforcing it? Of course, the mother's removal of the child to Florida from
New York without the father's consent raised a question as to
Florida's initial jurisdiction and had a bearing upon New York's
authority to modify the Florida decree, but the Court did not dis•
cuss these matters. 33
Some such misgivings are reflected in the comment of Justice
Rutledge, concurring dubitante:
"The result seems unfortunate in that, apparently, it may
make possible a continuing round of litigation over custody,
perhaps also of abduction between alienated parents. That
consequence hardly can be thought conducive to the child's
welfare.... The effect of the decision may be to set up an unseemly litigious competition between the states and their respective courts as well as between parents. Sometime, somehow, there should be an end to litigation in such matters.''34
Justice Frankfurter, also concurring, felt that "a court
which can actually lay hold of a child" may modify a custody decree but only on the basis of changed circumstances, not by substituting "its own view of what custody would be appropriate." 35
Finding no assurance in the record that Florida had jurisdiction
32 The Supreme Court later gave a negative answer to the question in May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528 (1953). See text accompanying note 43 infra. Since the child took its mother's
domicile after a valid Florida decree in her favor (see note 12 supra), the cases resting
custody jurisdiction on domicile (see note 9 supra) also answer in the negative as, in
effect, do the cases that deny relief to an abducting parent because he lacks clean
hands. See note 24 supra.
33 Justice Jackson, however, concurred in the result on the ground that Florida lacked
initial custody jurisdiction. 330 U.S. 610, 616 (1947).
34 330 U.S. 610, 619-20.
35 330 U.S. 610, 617.
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to make the initial decree or that the New York modification was
not permitted by Florida law, he accepted the validity of the New
York judgment.
The Ambiguity of Kovacs
The court's modus operandi in Kovacs v. Brewef& 6 was a replica of that employed in Halvey. The child had lived in North
Carolina with its paternal grandparents for three years, pursuant
to a valid New York custody decree, when the mother petitioned
for modification in New York. After a hearing in which the father
and grandfather contested without objection to jurisdiction, the
court modified the decree to give the mother custody.37 The child,
however, was kept in North Carolina contrary to the decree, and
fourteen months later the mother brought enforcement proceedings there. The North Carolina courts, after considering both subsequent and previously litigated events, decided that the child
should remain with the grandparents.
The Supreme Court neither affirmed nor reversed. It held on
the authority of Halvey that full faith and credit would not foreclose a North Carolina modification based on a subsequent change
in circumstances, as permitted by New York law, and remanded
to the state court for clarification as to whether the modification
rested on both prior and subsequent events or solely on the latter.
Left unanswered was the question whether the full faith and credit
clause forbade North Carolina to take the prior circumstances into
account.38 Justice Frankfurter, having altered his Halvey position, dissented from the implication he found in the majority
opinion that the New York decree was entitled to full faith and
credit in the absence of changed circumstances and asserted that
the state where the child is physically present can decide its custody
without being bound by a prior decree.
As in Halvey, the Kovacs opinion, while purporting to do no
more than avoid a definitive statement on the protection afforded
custody decrees by the full faith and credit clause, implied without discussion that North Carolina had due process jurisdiction to
modify the New York decree in the enforcement proceedings.
356 U.S. 604 (1958).
Defendants were thus probably foreclosed on two grounds from collaterally attacking jurisdiction: (a) consent (b) res judicata. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's
Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). But cf. Kovacs v. Brewer, 245 N.C. 630, 97 S.E.2d 96 (1957).
38 See quotation note 170 infra.
86
87
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The Blandness of Ford
A similar pattern was followed in Ford v. Ford,39 which added
nothing to the confusion. When the mother removed the children from the family home in North Carolina to Virginia, the
father petitioned for custody in the latter state. 40 The parents then
reached an agreement giving custody to the father for the school
year and to the mother during vacations. On the basis of this arrangement, the Virginia court dismissed the proceedings. Nine
months later the mother asked for custody in South Carolina shortly
after taking the children there during summer vacation; the father
contested without objection to the jurisdiction. The lower court
found no change in circumstances but refused to treat the Virginia
dismissal as a res judicata order fixing custody in accordance with
the agreement and gave the children to the mother for the school
year and to the father during vacations. The state supreme court
reversed on the ground that the dismissal order was res judicata in
Virginia in the absence of changed circumstances and therefore entitled to full faith and credit in South Carolina.
The United States Supreme Court did not have to decide
whether the dismissal order would have been entitled to full faith
and credit if made res judicata by Virginia law. Noting that private agreements are not controlling in custody proceedings, it
concluded that Virginia would not treat the order as res judicata
because neither the evidence, the agreement, nor the welfare of the
child had been considered by the court and held that South
Carolina therefore could make an independent custody determination.41
The Court again had no difficulty in avoiding a consideration
of the effect of full faith and credit on custody decrees and was
371 U.S. 187 (1962).
See Ford v. Ford, 239 S.C. 305, 307-08, 123 S.E.2d 33, 34 (1961).
South Carolina's enforcement of the Virginia judgment on the basis of the full
faith and credit clause presented a federal question reviewable by the Supreme Court
on certiorari. See 28 u.s.c. § 1257(3) (1958); ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME CouRT OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 15, 16, 59 (2d ed. 1951). In resolving suclI a
question the Court will, when appropriate, independently determine the res judicata
effect of the judgment under the law of the state that made it. See Barber v. Barber,
325 U.S. 77, 81 (1944); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 64 (1938). The South Carolina court
cited a number of Virginia cases in support of its conclusion that an agreed-upon dismissal order was res judicata in Virginia, but none of them involved a custody decree
(see Ford v. Ford, 239 S.C. 305, 123 S.E.2d 33 (1961)) while other cases suggested that
Virginia policy would not permit parents to foreclose by contract an adjudication of
custody based upon the cliild's best interests. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1962);
cf. Comment, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrees1, 73 YALE
L.J. 134 (1963).
89
40
41
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saved from exammmg the due process requirements for initial
custody jurisdiction by the father's acquiescence in the jurisdiction
of the South Carolina court.42

The May Coalition
May v. Anderson,43 which chronologically followed Halvey,
purported to decide the question of initial custody jurisdiction left
open in Halvey, but in fact decided very little. After the mother
had declared her intention to keep the children in Ohio where she
had temporarily taken them, the father obtained a custody decree
in Wisconsin, the state of the family home, and retrieved them.
The mother, personally served in Ohio, did not appear in the
Wisconsin action. Five years later she retained the children after a
visit, and the father petitioned in Ohio for habeas corpus, relying
on the Wisconsin decree which, under Ohio law, could not be
modified in such proceedings. The Ohio courts gave full faith and
credit to the Wisconsin decree and returned the children to the
father.
The Supreme Court reversed, dividing four ways. "The narrow
issue . . . presented," said Justice Burton for a plurality of
four, "was noted but not decided in Halvey v. Halvey .... [W]e
have before us the elemental question whether a court of a state,
where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor present [i.e., Wisconsin] may cut off her immediate right to the ... custody ... of
her minor children without having jurisdiction over her in personam. "44
The answer, surely predictable from the tautological question: 45 Wisconsin could not cut off "rights far more precious than
property rights" 46 without "in personam" jurisdiction over the
wife based upon her domicile, residence, or presence. Necessarily,
Ohio owed no full faith and credit to a decree issued without jurisdiction. The domicile of the children, even if with the father,
said Justice Burton in closing, "does not give Wisconsin, certainly
as against Ohio, the personal jurisdiction that it must have in order
42 Of course, the prior Supreme Court cases provided no basis for attacking the
jurisdiction on due process grounds.
48 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
44 Id. at 532-33.
411 Conventionally, the term "in personam jurisdiction" has been equated with the
domicile, residence, or service of the defendant in the forum state, in the absence of
consent.
46 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
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to deprive their mother of her personal right to their immediate
possession. " 47
Justice Frankfurter, in a volte face from his position in
Halvey, concurred on the ground that a state having a child "within
its borders" may enforce a valid custody decree on comity grounds
but is not compelled to give it full faith and credit, because the interest of that state in the welfare of the child overrides the "interest of national unity that underlies the Full Faith and Credit
Clause." He undertook, further, to state the true meaning of the
Burton opinion, declaring: "What is decided-the only thing the
Court decides-is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
require Ohio, in disposing of the custody of children in Ohio, to
accept, in the circumstances before us, the disposition made by
Wisconsin. " 48
But Justice Jackson, dissenting with Justice Reed, viewed the
Burton opinion as necessarily holding that Wisconsin lacked due
process jurisdiction over the mother. "The Court," he stated,
"apparently is holding that the Federal Constitution prohibits
Ohio from recognizing the validity of this Wisconsin divorce
decree. . . . If Wisconsin has rendered a valid judgment, the Constitution ... requires every state to give it full faith and credit. The
only escape from obedience lies in a holding that the judgment
rendered in Wisconsin is void and entitled to no standing even in
Wisconsin. It is void only if it denies due process of law." 49
Expressing fears that "this decision will author new confusions,"
Justice Jackson insisted that Wisconsin, the children's domicile, was primarily concerned with their welfare and had made
a valid decree entitled to full faith and credit. "If our federal system is to maintain separate legal communities," he observed, "there
must be some test for determining to which of these a person belongs. If for this purpose there is a better concept than domicile,
we have not yet hit upon it." He pointed out that under the plurality holding Wisconsin could not bind the mother and Ohio
could not bind the father, emphasized "the claim of the children ...
to have their status determined with reasonable certainty, and to
be free from an incessant tug of war between squabbling parents,"
and he objected to placing the convenience of a departing parent
47
48
49

Id. at 534.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 537.
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over a child's welfare. The Frankfurter position, he thought, "reduce[s] the law of custody to a rule of seize-and-run." 50
In the view of Justice Minton, also dissenting, the mother
had challenged the enforceability in Ohio of the Wisconsin decree
but not the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin court; he therefore assumed the validity of the decree but, unlike Justice Frankfurter,
concluded that it was entitled to full faith and credit. Justice Clark
did not participate in the decision.
Despite Justice Frankfurter's exegesis, the plurality opinion appears dedicated to the proposition that custody jurisdiction
can be acquired only by a state where the defendant is domiciled,
resident, or personally served.151 Justice Burton defines the "elemental question" not in terms of full faith and credit but in
terms of jurisdiction to cut off custody rights-rights more precious than property. A quotation from Baker v. Baker, Eccles &
Co. 152 attests that "it is now too well settled to be open to further
dispute that ... a judgment in personam [is not entitled to full
faith and credit if] it was rendered without jurisdiction over the
person sought to be bound." 53 Estin v. EstinM and Kreiger v. Kreiger,515 also cited, denied full faith and credit to alimony provisions
in Nevada divorce decrees because Nevada lacked "power" and
"jurisdiction" to make a property disposition binding on a nonpresent spouse and relied on Pennoyer v. Neff 56 and New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 157 both concerned with the due process
requirements for jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.
There remains Justice Burton's curious closing statement
that even if Wisconsin were the children's domicile, it would not
have, certainly as against Ohio, the jurisdiction to deprive the
mother of possession. But it is difficult to derive from those four
words the new and significant constitutional rule that a custody
decree, though meeting due process requirements, need not be
given full faith and credit if the defendant was not "present" in the
state.
The plurality decision can perhaps be confined on the facts to
Id. at 539-42.
Sec Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REv. 719, 766-70
(1961); Hazard, May v. Anderson: Prelude to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REv. 379 (1959).
152 242 U.S. 394, 401 (1916).
153 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
154 334 U.S. 541 (1948),
1515 334 U.S. 555 (1948).
156 See note 6 supra.
157 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
r;o
151
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the narrower holding that a state may not adjudicate the custody
rights of a defendant parent who is not "present" and has possession of the child, 58 but the language is not so limited. The "right
to custody" is declared to be "a personal right entitled to at least
as much protection as [the] right to alimony," which a court lacking in personam jurisdiction "is powerless to cut off." 59 No distinction is made between a defendant parent who possesses the child
and one who does not. Instead the issue is identified with the question left open in Halvey "whether in absence of personal service
the Florida decree of custody had any binding effect on the [nonresident] husband," 60 the child in that case having been in the possession of the plaintiff mother when the custody action was filed. 61
The ambiguous rationale of the plurality opinion thus apparently limits custody jurisdiction to a state where the defendant
is legally present. 62 But only half of the participating Justices took
58 See Hazard, supra note 51; cf. De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 112 Cal. 101
(1896).
59 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953).
60 Id. at 532-33.
61 The child was removed by the father the day before the decree (see text accompanying notes 26-28), but it is well settled that custody jurisdiction once obtained cannot
be defeated by removal of the child from the state before judgment. See cases collected in
Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 80 (1949). The plurality opinion in May makes no reference to the
last minute removal of the child in Halvey and gives no indication that such removal has
any bearing on the jurisdictional issue.
62 Domicile and physical presence of the child appear to be rejected as alternative
bases for jurisdiction. Presumably the "no jurisdiction" answer of the plurality opinion
would apply to the Florida decree in Halvey despite the physical presence of the child
in that state when proceedings were begun. See note 61 supra &: accompanying text.
See also Justice Jackson's comment in his May dissent that under the plurality opinion
"the Wisconsin courts cannot bind the mother and the Ohio courts cannot bind the
father." 345 U.S. 528, 539 (1953).
A footnote to the May plurality opinion states: "The instant case does not present
the special considerations that arise where a parent . . . leaves a jurisdiction for the
purpose of escaping process or otherwise evading jurisdiction, and we do not have here
the considerations that arise when children are unlawfully or surreptitiously taken by one
parent from the other." Id. at 535 n.8. No affirmative indication is given as to the effect
of such considerations on custody jurisdiction, and no inference in this regard appears
warranted, particularly because: (a) The May case, itself, seems to have involved a kind
of surreptitious removal of the children. As pointed out by Justice Jackson, dissenting: "The Ohio court specifically found that [the mother] brought the children to
Ohio with the understanding that if she decided not to go back to Wisconsin the
children were to be returned to that state. In spite of the fact that she did decide [in
the same month that she left] not to return, she kept the children in Ohio." Id. at 538.
(b) The Halvey case permitted an abducting parent to obtain a modification in the state
where the child was taken and May cites Halvey with apparent approval. (c) Since a
parent who departs in the aftermath of a marital dispute can not ordinarily be charged with
"escaping process or .•• evading jurisdiction" of a court before a suit is filed, this
reference constitutes little more than an affirmation of the well settled rule that the
defendant's departure from the state after an action has been filed need not defeat custody
jurisdiction. See cases cited in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 446-47 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7,
31-32, 68, 79-85 (1950). (d) Removal of the child before suit is not usually "unlawful" be•
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this view. Justices Jackson and Reed rejected it outright. Justice
Frankfurter necessarily rejected it by recognizing the due process
validity of the Wisconsin decree and the unfettered custody authority of the state where a child is physically present. Justice Minton's
assumption was contrary to it. On the issue of whether a valid custody decree is entitled to full faith and credit, three dissenting
Justices said yes, one concurring Justice said no, and the plurality
of four expressed no discernible opinion.63
THE PRINCIPAL POSITIONS ON CUSTODY JURISDICTION

From the Supreme Court cases, the state cases, the Restatement,
and commentary emerge the following views on the allocation of
authority to determine custody.
The Tentative Supreme Court Position. A state where the
defendant is domiciled, resident, or personally served may make
or modify a custody decree. 64 A decree may also be modified by a
state requested to enforce it and perhaps by the state that initially
made it. The protection afforded a custody decree by the full faith
and credit clause is uncertain.
The First Restatement-Jackson Position. The state of the
child's domicile may make or modify a custody decree, the child
taking the domicile of the possessing parent at the time of the
initial proceedings and of the prevailing parent thereafter. 65 Perhaps a decree may also be modified by a state requested to enforce
it66 or by the state that initially made it. 67 A valid custody decree
cause in most states either parent has a right to possession of the child until a custody
order has been made; only a removal in violation of such an order is "unlawful." See
!19 AM. JuR. Parent and Child § 8 (1942). Therefore, the reference to an unlawful taking
probably does not relate to a removal of the child at the outset of the custody dispute;
the meaning with regard to an abduction after a decree is obscure in the light of Halvey.
(e) Whatever the meaning of "surreptitious" in view of the May facts and the Halvey
decision, no basis is provided for reconciling the vague intimations of the footnote with
the premise of the opinion that custody jurisdiction depends on the legal presence of
the defendant.
63 The negative argument that the Court need not have decided the jurisdictional
issue if the Wisconsin decree were not entitled to full faith and credit is countered by
the negative argument that the Court had no need to decide the full faith and credit
issue if the Wisconsin court lacked jurisdiction.
64 Consent provides an additional basis for jurisdiction. See also text accompanying
notes 58-62 supra.
615 See notes 11, 12 supra.
66 Justice Jackson concurred only in the result in Halvey, on the ground that Florida
lacked initial custody jurisdiction. Justice Reed joined the majority in both Halvey and
Kovac.s. The first Restatement did not deal with this question.
67 See R=ATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws §§ 76, 105 (1934).
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is entitled to full faith and credit; matters previously decided may
not be relitigated in proceedings to enforce or modify it. 68
The Frankfurter-Physical Presence Position. The state where
the child is physically present has primary authority to make or
modify a custody decree, although a state where the child is domiciled69 or the defendant is legally present may also have due process jurisdiction. The state where the child is present need not give
full faith and credit to a foreign custody decree but may enforce
it on comity grounds.
The Sampsell-Second Restatement Position. The state where
the child is domiciled, the state where the child is physically present, and the state where the defendant is legally present have concurrent authority to make or modify a custody decree, but one
state may defer to the authority of another with a more substantial
interest. Perhaps the state that initially made a decree may also
modify it. 70 The child's domicile at the time of the initial proceedings is probably with either the father or the possessing parent,
depending on the law of the forum, 71 and with the prevailing
parent thereafter. 72 Custody decrees need not be given full faith
and credit, but a state should give respectful consideration to the
decision of another state and may enforce it on comity grounds.
THE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES IN ALLOCATING
CUSTODY JURISDICTION

Evaluation of these positions requires a statement of the goals
to be achieved by resolution of the interstate custody problem. A
meaningful choice cannot be made without a comparison of the
social consequences likely to ensue from the alternative solutions.
In defining authority to determine custody the following values
are significant, though they differ in importance and concomitant
attainment of all may not be possible.
First. The place of trial should be fair to the litigants. Fair
venue depends upon the accessibility of the tribunal to the parties,
the accessibility of the evidence to the tribunal, and the expectations of the parties as to the place of litigation. 78 Since the tribunal
Id. § 147.
The domicile may probably be that of either the father or the possessing parent
at the time of the initial proceedings and of the prevailing parent thereafter.
70 REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 117(b) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).
71 See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 773-74, 197 P .2d 739, 746-47 (1948).
72 See note 12 supra.
78 Accessibility of the tribunal to the parties involves such factors as expense and
difficulty of reaching the venue, difficulty of obtaining and communicating with a lawyer
68

69
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will almost certainly be more accessible to one party than to the
other when they are widely separated, its location should not be
subject to the arbitrary control of either.
Second. The welfare of the child is the first consideration in
determining its custody; the natural desire of the parents to enjoy
its society and participate in its upbringing is the second. 74 An
effective custody disposition requires an evaluation of the child's
physical, emotional, and educational needs and the capacity of each
parent to satisfy them. This determination should, wherever feasible, be made by the court most likely to decide correctly, i.e., by
the court having maximum access to the relevant evidence. A
court's access to the relevant evidence is increased when most of
the witnesses and pertinent physical locations are in the vicinity of
the court and when evidence and arguments are presented on behalf of each party in an adversary proceeding.
Third. Issues resolved in a fair hearing should not be redetermined in another forum. Relitigation is destructive of the emotional and environmental stability important to the child's welfare, 75 wasteful of private and public resources, and inimical to
the reasonable expectations of the initially prevailing party. For
the same reasons, constant attempts to modify a custody decree
should be discouraged.
Fourth. The factors that make repeated litigation undesirable
suggest that two courts should not concurrently determine custody.
After custody proceedings are initiated in a court with jurisdiction, no other court should exercise such authority.
Fifth. Respect by officials and residents of each state for the
authoritative institutional decisions of other states and cooperation
between officials in adjusting the rights and obligations of persons
living in different states are necessary to the effective adjudication
of child custody in a federal system.
at the venue, familiarity with the laws and customs of the venue, and these factors turn
upon the nature and extent of the contracts with the venue and activities carried on
there by the parties. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Fisher Governor Co. v.
Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1 (1959). Compare the doctrine of forum non
conveniens: Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); EHRENZWEIG, CoNFUCT OF LAWS
120-21 (1959). The requirement of an impartial tribunal is here assumed to be met in all
cases.
74 See Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 169, 347 So. 464, 466 (1933); REsTATEMENT
(SECOND), CONFUCT OF LAws § 117(a) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957); STUMBERG, CoNFUCT OF
LAws 321 (3d ed. 1963); Rheinstein, Jurisdiction in Matters of Child Custody, 26 CONN.
B.J. 44, 63-65 (1952).
7li See Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Across State Lines, 10 LAw &: CoNTEMP.
PROB. 819, 829 (1944); STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 74, at 323.

810

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

Sixth. Removal of the child by either parent in disregard of
the rights of the other and abduction or retention of the child by
either parent in violation of a valid decree should be discouraged.
Seventh. In most cases the child should maintain contact with
both parents. Visitation rights are important and entitled to protection.
Eighth. Parents should be able to ascertain with a reasonable
degree of certainty the tribunals having authority to determine
custody.
Ninth. Parents should be encouraged to settle custody disputes
without litigation and to respect each other's interests.
Tenth. The state where a child is physically present should
have authority to protect it against mistreatment or abuse.
Eleventh. The defendant should have fair notice of custody
proceedings. Such notice, whenever possible, should be given by
personal service upon the defendant and in any event by that
feasible method most likely to come to the defendant's attention.76
Publication in a newspaper is not sufficient if notice can be sent by
mail. 77
EVALUATION OF THE PRINCIPAL POSITIONS

When measured against these values, none of the positions heretofore discussed offers a satisfactory basis for allocation of custody
jurisdiction.
Initial Custody
All four positions encourage resort to self help at the outset of
a custody dispute by placing a parent who removes the child to another state in a strong tactical position. Having gained physical
custody, such a parent in most instances can either initiate proceedings in the new state or "sit tight," leaving the stay-at-home parent with no recourse other than to litigate in an inconvenient forum
far from the relevant evidence or to attempt a recapture of the
child.
Under the tentative Supreme Court position not only is a stayat-home parent's choice of venue pre-empted by the parent who
departs with the child; 78 apparently even a parent left with the
76 See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); cases collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d
7, 87 (1949); REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 74, 109 (1934).
77 See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 94 (1952); EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 73, at 82.
78 The departing parent can initiate custody proceedings only where the stay-at-home
parent is legally present, but the parent with possession of the child is often in no hurry
to go to court.
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child must petition for custody where the defendant can be found. 79
The first Restatement gives control of the child's domicile, and
therefore of the custody venue, to a parent who moves the child
permanently to another state. If the father's domicile is controlling,
his migration moves the custody venue whether or not he takes the
child with him. 80 By placing primary authority in the state where
the child is physically present, the Frankfurter position invites
removal of the child by a leave-taking parent. If a non-departing
parent obtains a custody decree in the home state, he may have to
relitigate the entire matter upon seeking enforcement in the state
where the child is located.
The Sampsell-Second Restatement position produces the
same results. Usually no other state has concurrent jurisdiction
when a child is taken to a new state by its father, because both
are domiciled and physically present there. 81 If the mother leaves
with the child, a non-departing father in a father-domicile jurisdiction may obtain a home state decree, but when he petitions for
enforcement, the state where the child is present can claim a
paramount interest and, after giving the decree respectful consideration, make a de novo custody determination. When divergent
parents proceed with separate actions, conflicting decrees may ensue as in Stout v. Pate (California) 82 and Pate v. Stout (Georgia) 83
where the parties litigated in two states and each decision favored
the resident parent; the Supreme Court discreetly folded its tent
and silently stole away. 84 But a decree must be enforced in the state
where the child is located, and therefore under both the Frankfurter and Sampsell positions that state usually has the last word. 85
See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra; cf. note 62 supra.
so See STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 74, at 41-42; Pieretti v. Pieretti, 13 N.J. Misc.
98, 176 Atl. 589 (Ch. 1935). If a motlier moves tlle child from a fatller domicile state to a
state tllat places tlle child's domicile witll tlle possessing parent, it is not clear which state
has jurisdiction on tlle basis of domicile. If each may apply its own test of domicile, concurrent jurisdiction is tlle result. Some states apparently assign the child a domicile witll
tlle "innocent" parent, tllereby requiring an assessment of fault between tlle spouses
as a preliminary to allocation of custody jurisdiction. See Stansbury, supra note 75. The
Supreme Court has long since abandoned as unworkable such a basis for divorce jurisdiction. See Williams v. Nortll Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U.S. 562 (1906).
81 The home state would have jurisdiction if tlle departing fatller petitioned tllere
for custody-an unlikely procedure.
82 120 Cal. App. 2d 699, 261 P.2d 788 (1953).
83 209 Ga. 786, 75 S.E.2d 748 (1953). See also Ex parte Peddicord, 269 Mich. 142, 256
N.W. 333 (1934); Wilson v. Wilson, 136 Va. 643, 118 S.E. 270 (1923).
84 Cert. denied, Stout v. Pate, 347 U.S. 968 (1954); cert. denied, Pate v. Stout, 347
U.S. 968 (1954).
85 See Ex parte Peddicord, 269 Mich. 142, 256 N.W. 333 (1934); Wilson v. Wilson,
136 Va. 643, 118 S.E. 270 (1923). Sampsell upheld tlle custody jurisdiction of California
70
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Of course, the state where a child is physically present has
an interest in its welfare-an interest which may be shared by several states. 86 But an interest in the child cannot justify the exercise
of custody jurisdiction.87 The court with fullest access to the pertinent evidence, and therefore best able to safeguard the child's
welfare, will not necessarily be in a state where the child is domiciled or present and is not likely to be in a state to which the child
has just been taken. The interest of such states in the child may
provide a cogent reason for not exercising jurisdiction. No state is
interested in providing an unfair or inadequate forum for the determination of child custody. On the contrary, all states are interested
in the orderly allocation of jurisdiction to the forum most capable
of doing justice.
While every state has authority to protect children there present
from mistreatment or abuse, such authority need not imply jurisdiction to bind an out-of-state parent by a custody decree. 88 If the
parent present with the child is guilty of mistreatment, the child
can be taken from that parent in a proceeding by the state. But a
stay-at-home parent should not be compelled to litigate custody in
an inconvenient forum that lacks full access to the evidence,
simply because the parent with the child is subject to control by
that forum. 89 A petition for custody by the possessing parent on
the ground that the stay-at-home parent is likely to abuse the child
need not be considered by the state where the child is located
as long as the child is in no present danger and another forum is
better able to make the decision. 90 Nor should the absence of the
child seriously inhibit the exercise of jurisdiction by the latter
over a mother and child who went from California to Nevada and then to Utah (see
text accompanying note 139 infra) but if Utah follows the Sampsell rule, the father
would probably have been better advised to proceed directly in that state.
86 A state ordinarily has an interest in the custody of a child when the child or one
of the persons claiming custody resides there.
87 Comparative state interest is of greater significance in choosing the rules of decision to be applied in a case with multi-state contacts than in allocating jurisdiction to
hear it. See note 185 infra. However, a state with no interest in the child should seldom
exercise custody jurisdiction. See note 115 infra.
88 See McMillan v. McMillan, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945); Finlay v. Finlay,
240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925); People ex rel. McGrath v. Gimler, 600 N.Y.S.2d
622 (1946); GooDRICH, CoNFUCT OF LAWS 421 (3d ed. 1949); REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAws §§ 118, 148 (1934).
89 If the out-of-state parent elects to initiate custody proceedings in the state where
the child is located, that state would then be an appropriate venue. See text accompanying
notes 117-19 infra.
90 See cases cited in note 88 supra. Usually, whatever the contentions, both parents
are fit to have custody, and the custody determination depends upon which can provide
the better care.
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forum. If the court wishes to question the child, the possessing
parent can be required to bring it to the hearing or suffer an adverse decision.
Modification
In the allocation of initial custody jurisdiction the four principal positions thus do not discourage unilateral removal of the child
and in many situations they fail to provide a forum fair to both
parents with maximum access to the relevant evidence. Nor do they
achieve these goals in allocating jurisdiction to modify custody
decrees.
A losing parent is encouraged to remove the child to another
state in violation of an initial decree if that decree may be modified
in the second state during proceedings brought by the winner to
reclaim the child. 91 Even if the second state will modify only on the
basis of a subsequent change in circumstances, the loser by these
tactics may, without regard to the expectations or convenience of
the prevailing parent, obtain a new determination of custody in a
forum of his own choosing far removed from the relevant evidence.
Under the Frankfurter and Sampsell positions, the loser can
also initiate a modification petition in the second state. The first
Restatement position, however, permits such a petition to modify
only at the child's domicile with the prevailing parent.92 In most
instances that domicile provides a fair venue near the pertinent
evidence, but it may not provide such a venue if the prevailing
parent has allowed the child to live with the loser for a long period
or has moved the child to another state in violation of the loser's
visitation rights, and when a decree divides custody between the
parents, both the domicile and physical presence rules may encourage successive attempts at modification as the custody shifts
back and forth. Nor is the court that made the original decree per
sea desirable venue for modification; after the parties have moved
away, that place of trial may be inconvenient and no longer close
to the evidence.
91 The modification jurisdiction of an enforcing court is recognized by the tentative
Supreme Court position, the Frankfurter position, the Sampsell position, and perhaps by
the first Restatement position. Some enforcing courts, however, refuse to consider modification when the defendant lacks clean hands. See note 24 supra. Criminal prosecution for
kidnapping is not an appropriate device for dealing with abduction of a child by a
parent in violation of a custody decree. Nor have contempt proceedings or surety bond
requirements proved effective in deterring such conduct. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 15
(1949).
92 Possibly, modification could also be requested in the state that made the prior
decree. See note 18 supra.
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Enforcement
By according full faith and credit to valid custody decrees, the
first Restatement position prevents a relitigation of issues in
enforcement and modification proceedings and thus makes abduction and repeated litigation after an initial decree less attractive.
The Frankfurter and Sampsell positions produce the opposite
effect by permitting a trial de novo in the state where the loser
wrongfully retains the child. If the first ruling is overturned, the
second round loser can try for a third decision by using similar
tactics to repossess the child.93 The tentative Supreme Court position, by avoiding the full faith and credit issue, also tends to invite
such conduct by the last loser.
The no-full-faith-and-credit rule cannot be rehabilitated by a
clean hands exception that bars an abducting loser from relitigating
in a second state.94 In the first place, the exception almost swallows
the rule by requiring interstate enforcement of custody decrees in
the large number of cases that involve wrongful abduction or
retention of children. 95 In the second place, the exception is contrary to the rule's rationale that the state's interest in the child justifies a de novo determination of custody. The clean hands doctrine
punishes the wrongdoing parent, but if the "interest" thesis is
sound, the court should make an independent custody determination to protect the child regardless of the transgressions of the
parents. 96 In the third place, the exception to the exception, that
an initially prevailing parent who has moved the child in violation
of the loser's visitation rights is not barred from relitigating a modification giving the loser custody,97 is inconsistent with the clean
hands principle unless visitation rights are so unimportant that
their impairment is noncontaminating.
To reconcile the punishment premise of clean hands with the
interest-in-the-child premise of no-full-faith-and-credit, it has been
suggested that the clean hands doctrine works in the child's best
interest because "stability of environment ... in itself is an important factor in the welfare of the child." 98 But this sound observation
does not bolster the clean hands exception so much as it undermines
the rule denying full faith and credit to custody decrees. 90
See Stout v. Pate, 120 Cal. App. 2d 699, 261 P.2d 788 (195!!).
See text accompanying note 24 supra.
See cases cited in note 24 supra.
96 See White v. White, 77 N.H. 26, 86 Atl. ll5ll (191!!).
97 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
98 EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 7ll, at 278; Stansbury, supra note 75, at 829.
99 See STUI\IBERG, op. cit. supra note 74, at ll2ll; 5ll HAAv. L. REv. 1024, 10!!0 (1940).
93

94
911
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Current Trends and Constitutional Principles
The position of the Second Restatement probably reflects an
inclination in the cases and the commentary100 toward the view
that authority to determine custody may rest with several states,
each free to accept or decline jurisdiction, to relitigate a prior decision or adopt it on comity grounds. The amorphous concepts of
comity and concurrent jurisdiction, however, do not furnish a
workable basis for allocation of custody jurisdiction. Since their
application depends upon the unpredictable discretion of the
courts of each state, they cannot provide a uniform national policy
where one is badly needed. They promote continuing uncertainty
in the resolution of custody disputes, continuing insecurity in the
relationship of the child to its parents, and continuing expense
to the individuals and the community. In an area characterized
by interminable litigation, the res judicata policy of full faith
and credit and the fair venue policy of due process have particular
relevancy. Protecting the child's welfare requires not an abandonment of these policies but an intelligent application of them.
Such an application should implement the social objectives heretofore discussed.
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ESTABLISHED HOME

What method of allocating custody jurisdiction would maximize the achievement of those objectives? The court most likely
to make a correct decision is the court having greatest access to the
relevant evidence, and that court usually will be located in the
state where the child has an established home101-an established
home being the last place where the child has lived with a parent102
for sufficient time to become integrated into the community. Such
integration involves becoming familiar with the physical and cul100 See EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 73, at 275; Rheinstein, supra note 74, at 44;
Stansbury, supra note 75.
101 See STOMBERG, op. cit. supra note 74, at 321. "If the foreign proceedings have
taken place in the state where the child habitually lives, not necessarily where it is
technically domiciled, it would seem desirable that other state courts should decline to
use their power merely because of the temporary presence of the child." Id. at 323.
"In all of [the cases in which the court has disregarded a foreign decree on the ground
of a material change in circumstances] which the writer has discovered, an existing
family unit in the forum state was affected by the litigation.••." Stansbury, supra note
75, at 830. See also Langan v. Langan, 150 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1945); authorities cited
in note 103 infra.
102 Or with some person acting as parent when a residence for the child is not
maintained by either parent.
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tural environment, making close personal attachments, and adjusting to an educational pattern.
In the vicinity of such an established home should be found
a substantial number of persons who are familiar with the child
and its family. A court located there can hear those witnesses and,
through a field investigation by court officials, also can examine
the environment in which the child has lived. 103

Initial Custody
In most cases the established home at the outset of custody
litigation is at the place where the child last lived with both parents,
but after the separation and before legal action a child may acquire
a new established home by living with one parent long enough to
become integrated into another community. The courts located
there are then in the best position to ascertain the present needs
of the child and the present capacity of the parent in possession,
although facts relating to the capacity of the other parent may be
somewhat less accessible. 104
The established home of the child also provides a venue which
in most cases is fair to both parents, not only because the evidence
is more readily available but also because that location is probably
accessible to both and each may reasonably expect custody to be
determined there. 105 As long as one parent resides in the state,
the nonresident is not unfairly inconvenienced by being required
to litigate where his child has lived for a substantial period and
where he can anticipate the custody decision will be made. His
part_icipation or his acquiescence in the maintenance of a home
for the child provides a significant contact with the state and suggests acceptance of its custody judisdiction.106
Jurisdiction at the established home minimizes the advantage
to be gained by taking the child to another state at the outset of
the custody dispute. Since the non-departing parent may initiate
proceedings in the home state, the leave-taker cannot control the
venue. Jurisdiction shifts to the second state only when the stay1os Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195 (1862); In re Penner, 161 Wash. 479, 297 Pac. 757
(1931); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 13-14 (1949).
104 So, too, after the separation a child might acquire an established home by living
for a sufficient time with a person exercising parental supervision.
If a parent moves with the child from one place to another within a state, the state
may be considered as the community for established home purposes because its courts
will have greatest access to relevant evidence within the state and the local venue may
be adjusted on the basis of such access.
105 See note 73 supra, and cases cited in note 103 supra.
106 See text accompanying notes 148-51 supra.
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at-home parent fails to take action for a period long enough to
permit the child to acquire a new established home. 107
A stay-at-home parent who does not know where the leave-taker
has gone with the child can file a timely action in the home state
to establish jurisdiction, deferring personal service until they have
been located.108 However custody authority is allocated, an abductor
may try to conceal the location of the child in order to forestall
action by the other parent.109 When the abductor and the child
cannot be found until a new established home exists, the goal of
providing a venue with maximum access to the evidence conflicts
with the goals of providing a fair venue free from the arbitrary
control of either party and diminishing the incentives for concealment of the child. But the latter values appear to outweigh the
former, especially because substantial evidence usually remains
available at the first home. The initial state can probably make a
valid custody disposition after published notice when a departing
parent has disappeared with the child,110 but the hearing may well
be deferred until the child is found since no decree can be enforced
until then. 111
The concept of the established home thus provides a rational
principle for allocation of custody jurisdiction, but application of
the principle to specific situations presents additional problems.
(I) While in many cases the established home location will be
obvious, in others it may involve a difficult factual determination.
The time required for a child to become integrated into a community on the basis of the factors suggested will vary with the
107 The usual time lag between filing the action and trial should not operate to
divest jurisdiction once obtained. When the delay is substantial, a prompt preliminary
hearing to determine custody pendente lite is usually available.
108 Service should ordinarily be made by manual delivery or registered mail. See
notes 76, 77 supra. If the absent parent does not retain possession of the child and
cannot be located, service on the person with whom the child resides and mailing to
the last known address of the absentee would probably satisfy due process.
100 In most cases the stay-at-home parent soon ascertains the whereabouts of the
departing parent and the child from statements made by the leavetaker before departure;
knowledge about the leavetaker's family, friends, employment, plans, and personal affairs;
and subsequent communications from the leavetaker concerning money, property, personal
effects, and divorce proceedings.
110 See text accompanying notes 76, 77 supra.
111 The state where the child is physically present should enforce the decree without
considering modification if the prevailing parent proceeds promptly to obtain and enforce
the decree after locating the child. See text accompanying notes 123, 171-76 infra.
A default decree based on published notice may be justified if the non-departing
parent may thereby obtain the assistance of law enforcement officials in locating the
child. See note 121 infra.
Any proceedings initiated in the second state by the departing parent after creation
of an established home should be dismissed upon proof of the prior pending action.
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age and intelligence of the child, the capacity of the parents, and
the nature of the environment. After the child has resided for
more than a short period with a parent who has removed it to a
second state, the identity of the court with custody jurisdiction
may become uncertain.112 Of course, an aura of unpredictability
surrounds the judicial application of every rule, and as a basis
for jurisdiction the established home concept probably creates
no greater uncertainty than domicile and a good deal less than
comparative state interest. But the area of uncertainty is reduced
if the time necessary to create an established home is defined.
Most American children are integrated into an American
community after living there six months; consequently this period
of residence would seem to provide a reasonable criterion for identifying the established home. While children under two years of
age do not usually have close friends or an organized pattern of
education and cannot become as familiar with the environment
as older children, the doctors, nurses, domestic helpers, baby sitters, neighbors, and visitors likely to become acquainted with a
young child and its family during half a year probably constitute
the largest source of evidence relating to its custody.
(2) If the child has not lived in any one place long enough to
acquire an established home, the place of the child's last nontransient abode with both parents is the most significant source
of evidence about the family and provides a venue convenient at
least to the stay-at-home parent, free from the arbitrary control of
either, and probably consistent with their reasonable expectations.113
(3) When parents and child leave the established home state
before the separation and do not thereafter return, the appropriate
custody venue, until a new established home exists, is probably
the state of the last non-transient family abode. Although much
of the relevant evidence may remain in the prior home state,
more recent evidence about the family is present at the last non112 A litigated decision of the jurisdictional question in either state would bind
both parties, but contradictory default judgments would produce protracted litigation.
113 If a child born after separation of the parents has no established home when
custody proceedings are begun, the place of its residence is probably the venue most
nearly in accord with the reasonable expectations of the parents. Although the mother
may control the custody venue by removing an unborn child to another state at the
outset of the marital dispute, a preguant mother is not likely to be strongly motivated in
her moves by possible future litigation over custody, and no father-child relationship as
yet exists to be disrupted by the move. The custody of a new-born child will, of course,
almost always be given to the mother, but determination of visitation rights makes the
place of trial important to the father.

1964]

CHILD CUSTODY

819

transient abode and litigation there usually better fits the convenience of the stay-at-home parent and the expectations of both.
(4) But custody should not ordinarily be adjudicated in a state
where none of the parties resides at the outset of the litigation,
though it be the state of the established home or the last nontransient abode: (a) in most cases that venue is inconvenient to
both parents, although occasionally it may remain congenial to
a parent in an adjoining state; 114 (b) the accessibility of evidence
in that venue is subtantially reduced by the inhibition upon
a full adversary presentation that results from the non-residence
of all the persons involved in the dispute; (c) that state no longer
has any interest in adjusting the relationship of the parties.115 The
non-possessing parent may petition for custody in such a state
before departing or while the possessing parent or the child lives
there, but when all are gone, the reasonable alternative venue is
the place where the child resides when proceedings are begun.116
(5) The question remains whether the parties may consent
to the exercise of jurisdiction by a court that is not in the established
home state. A forum selected by one parent and accepted by the
other without objection provides a venue convenient to both in
which a full adversary proceeding is likely to occur. Since such
an adversary proceeding increases the availability of the evidence
and the probabilities of a correct decision, the same values that
underlie the established home principle support the jurisdiction
of such a forum. Consent has long provided a basis for jurisdiction
over person in conventional two-party litigation; 117 in custody
114 The residence of the child would ordinarily be the most convenient venue to
the possessing parent, while both of these venues would be inconvenient to a non-possessing
parent who had moved a substantial distance from the home state. In any event, a
parent who is left with the child in the home state and then moves to a new state
probably should not be required to litigate custody in a forum that has become inconvenient.
115 It has previously been suggested that a state's interest in a child does not justify
the exercise of custody jurisdiction. See note 87 supra and accompanying text. It is here
suggested that the absence of an interest in the child on the part of a state is a significant
reason why that state should not exercise custody jurisdiction. See note 118 infra.
116 If the child attends a boarding school or lives temporarily with friends or
relatives, jurisdiction should remain with the state where the possessing parent continues to maintain a residence for the child, but if no such residence is maintained, venue
should be at the place where the child resides with a person acting as parent.
117 See EHRENZWEIG, op. dt. supra note 73, at 89. A court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter of litigation (sometimes referred to as the "competency" of the tribunal)
is generally derived from the state or federal constitution and statutes. State statutes
or constitutional provisions identify the courts that are authorized to decide cases
involving the subject matter of child custody. Such subject matter jurisdiction (i.e.,
competency) cannot ordinarily be conferred on a court by consent of the parties. See
REsTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 7 (1942); EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 73, at 73 n.6, 74, 89
n.8. The authority of a court to adjudicate rights and obligations relating to a "res" is
also sometimes called subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 74; cf. note 146 infra.
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proceedings, too, an effective disposition is likely to result from
the decision of a court whose authority is recognized by both
claimants.118
For the same reasons, the state where the child has been taken
by a departing parent may properly exercise jurisdiction when, in
order to expedite proceedings, the stay-at-home parent elects to
sue there for custody; the venue, being the choice of the plaintiff
and not reasonably objectionable to the defendant, is fair and
conducive to adversary presentation.119
Modification
The established home principle also provides a workable basis
for allocating authority to modify custody decrees. Since modifications are based primarily upon events occurring after the initial
decree,120 most of the relevant evidence is likely to be available
at an established home acquired by the child subsequent to that
decree. The loser cannot automatically change the modification
venue by removing the child. Such jurisdiction will shift only if
the prevailing parent takes no action until the child has acquired
an established home in the second state. When the loser and the
child cannot be located in time to prevent the creation of such a
home, 121 the second state should resolve the conflict in values122 by
returning the child to the prevailing parent without considering
the loser's request for modification if, under the circumstances,
the prior home state remains a fair venue for litigating that issue. 123
118 A forum whose jurisdiction depends on consent of the defendant will almost
always have an interest in the child's custody, because the proceedings will almost always
be brought in a state where the plaintiff, the defendant, or the child resides. A forum
that has no connection with the parties or the litigation may reasonably refuse to exercise
jurisdiction despite the consent of the parties. See note 115 supra. Compare the doctrine
of forum non conveniens pursuant to which a court with jurisdiction may dismiss an
action by a nonresident plaintiff against a nonresident individual defendant or a foreign
corporate defendant based on events occurring out of the forum. See cases and authorities
collected in EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 73, at 120 nn.l & 2, 121 nn. 5 & 6.
119 In order to obtain a prompt decision the plaintiff might forego suit in the home
state because nonresident defendants are usually given a substantially longer time than
residents in which to answer a complaint. If suit is brought in the home state, an order
by the court fixing custody pendente lite, after fair notice to the defendant, should be
given full faith and credit in the state where the child is present. See text accompanying
notes 156-59 infra.
120 Some states also permit consideration of any facts not presented to the first court.
121 The winner usually knows the loser's last residence and place of employment,
and since abduction in violation of a decree is unlawful, law enforcement officials may
also assist in locating the child. Criminal prosecution for kidnapping, however, is not
an appropriate device for dealing with such abductions. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 15
(1949).
122 See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
123 See Crocker v. Crocker, 122 Colo. 49, 219 P .2d 311 (1950); In re Penner, 161 Wash.
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Until the child acquires an established home after the decree,
the state of the decree probably remains the fairest venue in which
to litigate modification so long as the child resides there or, if the
loser has wrongfully removed the child, so long as the prevailing
parent resides there. 124 In most cases that state was the established
home of the child at the time of the decree; its courts have already
considered matters relating to the child's welfare and have substantial access to evidence relating to changed circumstances; its jurisdiction is not subject to divestment by unilateral action, and an
absent parent, having previously litigated in the state, is likely to
retain adequate contacts there for purposes of litigation. But when
the prevailing parent also leaves without taking action after the
loser has removed the child, then the state where the child is
living appears to provide the most reasonable modification
venue. 1215
The state of the decree probably continues to be the fairest
venue for modification pending the acquisition of an established
home when the prevailing parent takes the child to another state
without express authorization in the decree and thereby impairs
the visitation rights of a resident loser. 126 Such continuing jurisdiction is supported by the factors mentioned above and prods the
prevailing parent into reaching some agreement with the loser, or
obtaining a judicial adjustment of competing claims, before moving away with the child.127 But if the loser does not reside in the
state of the decree, his visitation rights are not so seriously affected
by such a move, and with all of the parties gone from that state, the
new residence of the child and the prevailing parent seems to offer
the fairest modification venue.
When the prevailing parent takes the child to another state
pursuant to express authorization in the decree, the loser's visitation rights are not unfairly impaired because they have been de479, 297 Pac. 755 (1931). A stay-at-home parent can file an action for initial custody in
the home state to establish jurisdiction when a departing parent disappears with the
child (see text accompanying note 108 supra), but after a decree, the prevailing parent's
appropriate remedy against an abducting loser ordinarily is to seek enforcement of the
existing decree in the state where the child is located. See text accompanying notes 171-76
infra.
124 Cf. cases cited in note 18 supra.
1211 By leaving the state of the decree without taking action the prevailing parent in
effect acquiesces in the jurisdiction of the state where the child resides with the loser.
See text accompanying note 106 supra and notes 148-52 infra.
126 Cf. cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 457 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7,
48-49, 93, 95-96 (1949).
127 With such a move impending, the court might award the loser custody for part
of the year.
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fined with reference to such a move; the convenience and expectations of the parties and the accessibility of evidence as to events
occurring after the move then point to the new state as the appropriate forum until an established home has been acquired. 128
Once an established home exists, the state where it is located
should retain jurisdiction to modify until a new one is acquired or
until all of the persons involved are gone. 129 In the latter event, the
fairest modification venue is probably at the last non-transient
abode of the child and the prevailing parent,130 but if the prevailing
parent leaves that state after the loser has removed the child, the
place where the child resides should provide the venue. 181

Divided Custody
When a decree divides custody between the parents,132 the established home principle will place modification jurisdiction in
the state where the child lives for more than half the year unless
the parent with the shorter period of custody retains the child for
a total of six months without action by the other. Usually a shorter
custody period covers school vacations and does not exceed three
consecutive months. If the shorter period covers four or five
months, however, perhaps in fairness to the primary parent the
established home should not change until the child has been retained by the secondary parent at least three months beyond the
end of the shorter custody period.
If the decree gives each parent custody for half the time, the
established home ordinarily will be not in the state where the child
resides but rather in the state where it last resided. Under such
circumstances, in order to insure a local venue each parent may be
tempted to request modification in his own state after a six-month
period of possession and to retain the child pending a decision.
This incentive to litigation and wrongful retention can be negated
by •confining modification jurisdiction in such cases to the state
128 If the prevailing parent thereafter moves with the child to an unauthorized state,
the state of the last authorized residence should retain interim authority to modify
provided the loser resides there; if he still lives in the state of the decree, that state
should retain such authority for the reasons previously given. Otherwise, the new state
appears to be the fairest place to litigate modification until an established home is
created.
129 Cf. cases collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 85-87 (1949).
130 Or a person acting as parent when the prevailing parent does not continue to
maintain a residence for the child.
131 This may be with the losing parent or with a person acting as parent if the loser
does not continue to maintain a residence for the child.
132 See Stansbury, supra note 75, at 822.
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where the defendant parent resides, unless the child has lived with
the plaintiff for substantially more than six months. An additional
period of three months should give the defendant a reasonable
time in which to act before the plaintiff's residence becomes the
established home.
When the custody of the child is divided between the parents
by agreement rather than by decree, the same jurisdictional principles are applicable if one of the parents thereafter requests a
custody adjudication. Private custody agreements are not binding
in subsequent judicial proceedings because such arrangements are
enforceable only when in the best interests of the child,133 but parents should be encouraged to make and respect custody agreements,
and allocation of jurisdiction on the foregoing basis would discourage facile breach.
AUTHORITATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE
ESTABLISHED HOME PRINCIPLE

Although nowhere explicitly adopted, the principle of the established home184 is implicit in many of the decisions that accept
one or another of the conventional bases for custody jurisdiction;
in fact, it reconciles to some extent those apparently diverse
positions.
In many cases the domicile concept provides a vehicle for preserving jurisdiction in the established home state when the child
has been recently removed. 135 On the other hand, the physical presence rule is used by a number of courts as a device for retaining
jurisdiction in the state where the child has an established home
but not a domicile. 186
133 See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 190-91 (1962); cases collected in 17A AM. JUR.
Divorce and Separation § 818 (1942).
134 The established home principle refers to allocation of custody jurisdiction to the
established home state or to alternative jurisdictions, as herein discussed.
135 Kugle v. Harpe, 234 Ala. 494, 176 So. 617 (1937); Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal. 2d 719,
68 P.2d 719 (1937); In re Simpson, 87 Cal. App. 2d 848, 197 P.2d 820 (1948); McMillin
v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945); Breene v. Breene, 51 Colo. 342, 117 Pac. 100
(1911); Minick v. Minick, Ill Fla. 469, 149 So. 483 (1933); Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195,
(1862); Heard v. Heard, 323 Mass. 357, 82 N.E.2d 219 (1948); Glass v. Glass, 260 Mass.
562, 157 N.E. 621 (1927); Beckman v. Beckman, 218 S.W.2d 566 (Mo. 1949); People ex rel.
Allen v. Allen, 40 Hun 611 (N.Y. 1886); Chapman v. Walker, 144 Okla. 83, 289
Pac. 740 (1930); Hughes v. Hughes, 180 Ore. 575, 178 P.2d 170 (1947); Commonwealth v.
Camp, 150 Pa. Super. 649, 29 A.2d 363 (1942): Commonwealth v. Rahal, 48 Pa. D. & C.
568 (1942); Shaw v. Shaw, 114 S.C. 300, 103 S.E. 526 (1920); Cusack v. Cusack, 107 S.W.2d
1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); State ex rel. Marthens v. Superior Court, 25 Wash. 2d 125,
169 P.2d 626 (1946); Jones v. Mccloud, 19 Wash. 2d 314, 142 P.2d 397 (1943); In re
Burns, 194 Wash. 293, 77 P.2d 1025 (1938); Motichka v. Rollands, 144 Wash. 565, 258
Pac. 333 (1927).
136 Slack v. Perrine, 9 App. D.C. 128 (Ct. App. 1896); Kelsey v. Greene, 69 Conn. 291, 37
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In most cases denying recognition to a foreign custody decree,
the child's established home at the time of the petition and decree
was not in the initial forum, 137 while in almost all of the decisions
barring a loser with unclean hands from litigating in a second
forum the child's established home remained in the first forum. 188
The decision in Sampsell had the effect of allowing the established home state to exercise custody jurisdiction although the
child had been permanently removed before proceedings were
begun. The father petitioned for custody in California, where the
established family home was located, three months after the mother
had removed the child to Nevada. 139 The mother then obtained
a Nevada divorce and custody decree by default,140 which she
Atl. 679 (1897); Little v. Franklin, 40 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1949); White v. White, 214 Ind. 405,
15 N.E.2d 86 (1938); Barnett v. Blakley, 202 Iowa I, 207 N.W. 412 (1926); Schmidt v.
Schmidt, 280 Mass. 216, 182 N.E. 374 (1932); In re Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38 N.W. 876
(1888); Hanrahan v. Sears, 72 N.H. 71, 54 Atl. 702 (1903); Kovacs v. Brewer, 245 N.C.
630, 97 S.E.2d 96 (1957); In re Strininger, 260 Ohio Op. 4, 11 Ohio Supp. 60 (1940); Heide
v. Kiskaddon, 79 Okla. 6, 190 Pac. 859 (1920); Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven,
298 Pa. 416, 148 Atl. 524 (1930); Wilkins' Guardian, 146 Pa. 585, 23 Atl. 325 (1892):
Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779 (1917): Duncan v. Duncan, 197 S.W.2d
229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Re Gay, 59 Ont. L. 40, 3 D.L.R. 349 (1926); see STUMBERG,
op. dt. supra note 74, at 327 n.20.
137 Langan v. Langan, 150 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1945); People v. Madden, 104 Colo. 252,
90 P.2d 621 (1939); Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A.2d 521 (1948); Little v.
Franklin, 40 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1949); Elliott v. Elliott, 181 Ga. 545, 182 S.E. 845 (1935);
Brandon v. Brandon, 154 Ga. 661, 115 S.E. 115 (1922); Shorter v. Williams, 74 Ga. 539
(1885); Griffin v. Harmon, 35 Ga. App. 40, 132 S.E. 108 (1926); Duryea v. Duryea, 46
Idaho 512, 269 Pac. 987 (1928); Weber v. Redding, 200 Ind. 448, 163 N.E. 269 (1928);
Barnett v. Blakley, 202 Iowa 1, 209 N.W. 412 (1926); Kline v. Kline, 57 Iowa 386, 10
N.W. 825 (1881); Kruse v. Kruse, 150 Kan. 946, 96 P.2d 849 (1939); Woodall v. Alexander,
107 Kan. 632, 193 Pac. 185 (1920); Pinney v. Sulzen, 91 Kan. 407, 137 P. 987 (1914); In re
Volk, 254 Mich. 25, 235 N.W. 854 (1931); In re Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38 N.W. 876 (1888);
McAdams v. McFerron, 180 Miss. 644, 178 So. 333 (1938); In re Reed, 152 Neb. 819, 43
N.W.2d 161 (1950); Brown v. Parsons, 136 N.J. Eq. 493, 42 A.2d 852 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1945);
In re Erving, 109 N.J. Eq. 294, 157 Atl. 161 (Ch. 1931); Casteel v. Casteel, 45 N.J. Super.
338, 132 A.2d 529 (Super. Ct. 1957); People ex rel. Herzog v. Morgan, 287 N.Y. 317, 39
N.E.2d 255 (1942); Elkins v. Elkins, 268 App. Div. 938, 51 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1944); Pickle
v. Pickle, 215 App. Div. 38, 213 N.Y. Supp. 70 (1925): Black v. Black, 110 Ohio St. 392,
144 N.E. 268 (1924); Heide v. Kiskaddon, 79 Okla. 6, 190 P. 859 (1920); Wilson v. Wilson,
136 Va. 643, 118 S.E. 270 (1923).
138 State v. Black, 239 Ala. 644, 196 So. 713 (1940); Kugle v. Harpe, 234 Ala. 494, 176
So. 617 (1937); Bums v. Shapley, 16 Ala. App. 297, 77 So. 447 (1917): In re Simpson, 87
Cal. App. 2d 848, 197 P.2d 820 (1948); Evans v. Evans, 314 P.2d 291 (Colo. 1957);
Crocker v. Crocker, 122 Colo. 49, 219 P.2d 311 (1950); McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo.
247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945). Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195 (1862); Shippen v. Bailey, 303 Ky. 10,
196 S.W.2d 425 (1946); In re Hubbard, 82 N.Y. 90 (1880); Chapman v. Walker, 144 Okla.
83, 289 Pac. 740 (1930); Cecil v. State ex rel. Cecil, 192 Tenn. 74, 237 S.W.2d 558 (1951);
State ex rel. French v. French, 182 Tenn. 606, 188 S.W.2d 603 (1945); Wilson v. Elliott,
96 Tex. 472, 75 S.W. 368 (1903); Mauldin v. Buchanan, 198 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946); In re Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d 419, 174 P.2d 790 (1946); In re Bums, 194 Wash. 293,
77 P .2d 1025 (1938).
139 The mother apparently received notice in Nevada.
140 The father apparently received notice in California.
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pleaded as a bar in the California action. Four months later she
took the child to Utah and remarried. When the trial court ruled
that it lacked jurisdiction to determine custody pendente lite, the
father petitioned for mandamus. 141 Assuming the truth of his allegation that the mother and child remained California domiciliaries while in Nevada,1 42 the state supreme court held that California was "not deprive[d] ... of jurisdiction over the child" by
the Nevada decree, "for the state of domicile, where the child has
lived most of its life, clearly has as substantial an interest in the
child's welfare as a state in which the child's presence was merely
temporary. " 143
Although speaking in terms of domicile and comparative state
interest, the court thus emphasized the importance of the child's
home as a factor in allocating custody jurisdiction. Under the
Restatement view, apparently followed in California,144 that a
child takes the domicile not of its father but of the possessing
parent, the child may in fact have been domiciled in Nevada with
its mother when the father petitioned for custody.145 In that event
California's jurisdiction could be supported only on the established
home principle. 146
141 The interlocutory order was not appealable before final judgment and no other
adequate remedy was available to test his right to a hearing on the issue of custody
pending trial. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 772-73, 197 P.2d 739, 746 (1948).
142 This allegation was made by the father in his petition for custody pendente lite
and in his petition for mandamus. The mother demurred to the mandamus petition.
143 32 Cal. 2d 763, 780-81, 197 P.2d 739, 751 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
144 32 Cal. 2d 763, 773-74, 197 P.2d 739, 746-47 (1948).
HIS The father alleged that the Nevada domicile was fraudulent and that the mother
remained domiciled in California until she arrived in Utah because on leaving she had
told him she was going to remarry and live in Utah after obtaining a Nevada divorce. See
GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 88, at 60. In fact, she lived in Nevada with the child for about
7½ months, which was substantially longer than the six weeks residence required for the
divorce, before remarrying in Utah, and she never returned to California. If she went
to Nevada intending to live there until her remarriage at some future time, a court
could reasonably find she was domiciled in Nevada until she moved to Utah. Id. at 64.
A peremptory writ of mandate was issued by the supreme court directing the trial
court to exercise jurisdiction in the custody proceedings, but presumably that court
would first determine whether the mother and child in fact remained domiciled in
California after going to Nevada.
140 The opinion also states that the mother consented to California's jurisdiction
over her person by answering the initial custody petition without objection to jurisdiction but that such consent could not extend to jurisdiction over "subject matter"
which was the issue before the court. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 773, 197 P.2d 739, 746 (1948). (Although the mother pleaded the Nevada decree as a bar to the initial petition she did
not explicitly urge lack of jurisdiction until the father requested custody pendente lite.)
But cf. note 117 supra and accompanying text; cases indicating that a court with "in
personam" jurisdiction over the parents has authority to determine custody of a child
neither domiciled nor present in the state, collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 440 n.17
(1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 30-31, 64, 78-79, 93-94 (1949). Established home jurisdiction
would be reinforced by consent of the mother.
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Use of the established home principle to determine custody jurisdiction does not offend previously developed constitutional standards for allocation of "in personam" jurisdiction among the states.
The tentative Supreme Court position, as manifested by the
May plurality opinion, is a rudimentary application of Pennoyer
v. Neff to child custody cases, the parent-child relationship being
treated as a disputed claim resolvable where the defendant is
"present" rather than as a "res" disposable at the child's domicile.
But the underlying premise of Pennoyer, that a state lacks power
to impose personal obligations upon someone neither domiciled,
resident, nor served within its boundaries,141 is not consistent with
the structure of the federal system. A state does have power to determine the personal obligations of an individual not there "present" if the Constitution, backed by federal authority, makes the
determination binding throughout the country. In International
Shoe,148 unmentioned in May, the Supreme Court declared that a
state could exercise jurisdiction over an absent defendant who had
"minimum contacts" with it sufficient to satisfy "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Other Supreme Court
decisions ignored by May had held that a nonresident motoristt<t0
and a nonresident securities dealer150 who were neither domiciled,
resident, nor served in the forum state could be personally subject
to its jurisdiction in litigation arising out of activities which they
had carried on there, in the latter case through agents. More recently the Court has applied the principle to a mail order insurance company whose agents were never in the forum state.151
A child's residence at an established home constitutes a kind
of parental "activity" in that state probably sufficient to provide
the minimum contact necessary to subject an absent parent to its
custody jurisdiction without offending traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. These notions are particularized in
the due process values heretofore discussed, and a defendant necessarily has an adequate contact with a venue that substantially implements them. Conventional jurisdictional rules requiring a
plaintiff to sue where the defendant is located often reflect a sound
policy of inhibiting unfounded nuisance suits, easily filed at the
plaintiff's residence, but that policy has little relevance to initial
14.7
14.8
14.9
150
151

Assuming no consent to the jurisdiction.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945).
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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custody litigation, and the plaintiff gains no unfair advantage from
an established home forum.
Jurisdiction based upon the established home principle is no
less consistent with due process of law than jurisdiction based upon
the domicile or the physical presence of the child. The evanescent
"res" that appears to hover at the domicile or to permeate the child
may also be found to frequent the established home by a sensitive
judicial medium. If the "res" will not materialize and concepts of
fairness and justice must be substituted as the due process test of
jurisdiction, a state where the child is domiciled or physically
present cannot be said to provide a fairer venue for a nonresident
parent than the state of the child's established home.
The Supreme Court, in delineating constitutional requirements for divorce jurisdiction, has declared that "judicial power
to grant a divorce ... is founded on domicile." 152 The established
home concept can perform a similar function in child custody litigation. The six-month test for acquisition of an established home
may suggest a legislative solution, perhaps in the form of a uniform
act or even a congressional statute,153 but the derivation of such a
jurisdictional formula is not beyond the judicial capacity. By
limiting divorce jurisdiction to the "matrimonial" domicile, the
Supreme Court of an earlier day made the fault of the spouses a
jurisdictional criterion.154 More recently a federal court of appeals
has discerned a due process objection to divorce jurisdiction based
upon domicile presumed from a short residence. 155 The vagueness
of these jurisdictional limitations, when compared to a six-month
residence requirement for the creation of an established home,
does not make the latter a less appropriate judicial norm.
152 See Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226
(1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S.
562 (1906); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901);
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
153 Since the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides a limitation
upon the exercise of state judicial authority, Congress, pursuant to its power to enforce
by appropriate legislation the provisions of that amendment, could probably specify
such a requirement for the exercise of state custody jurisdiction over nonresidents. Con•
gress, acting pursuant to its power under article IV, § I, to prescribe the effect
in each state of the properly proved judicial proceedings of other states, could probably
specify full faith and credit protection for judgments meeting such a jurisdictional
requirement.
1154 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906); Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155
(1901). See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); RFsrATEMENT, CoNFucr OF
LA.ws § 113 (1934).
155 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953). See also Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala.
73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948).
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INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF CUSTODY DECREES

The Application of Full Faith and Credit
The custody decree of a court whose jurisdiction is supported
by the established home principle156 ought to receive the protection
of the full faith and credit clause. That clause compels interstate
recognition of a divorce decreed by the plaintiff's domiciliary
state,157 the finding of domicile being as binding in other jurisdictions as it is in the forum upon a defendant who participated in the
proceedings.158 Surely the constitutional policies of res judicata
and interstate respect are significant in the adjustment of the parentchild relationship as well as the dissolution of the marital relationship. To discourage abduction, to limit the waste in individual and
social resources involved in relitigation, to provide greater psychological stability for the child, to protect the reasonable expectations of the prevailing parent, and to promote federal cohesion,
each state should accept and enforce the valid custody determinations of every other state without readjudicating previously decided issues. 159
See note 134 supra.
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). See cases cited in note 158 infra.
Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Davis v.
Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938). Such a decree, including the finding of domicile, also has the
same immunity in other states from attack by third persons that it has in the forum.
Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951). In Williams
v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), the finding of domicile was held subject to attack
by a state in a bigamy prosecution against a plaintiff who had returned and remarried
after obtaining a divorce elsewhere, but the decree was by default, and the jurisdictional
issue was therefore not res judicata. Whether such a prosecuting state could attack the
jurisdictional finding of domicile by the divorce forum when the defending spouse had
appeared in the divorce proceedings remains uncertain. Allocation of divorce jurisdiction
resolves the question of choice of law as well as of fair venue, because the forum usually
applies its own grounds for divorce. The interest of the state of the marital residence in
specifying the grounds for dissolution of the marriage may be of sufficient dimension to
justify an independent canvass of the domicile issue in a bigamy prosecution, but the
security of status provided by recognition in all proceedings of non-default divorce decrees
is of such importance to the parties, their subsequent spouses, their children, and the
community as probably to linrlt the scope of the criminal sanction. No equivalent choice
of law issue arises in child custody litigation. See note 185 infra. But cf. Comment, 73
YALE L.J. 134 (1963).
159 See text accompanying notes 75, 81-85, 91-100 supra.
Issues that can be relitigated in the initial forum may be relitigated by a court having
modification jurisdiction without violating full faith and credit. See Kovacs v. Brewer,
356 U.S. 604 (1958). But most jurisdictions apply res judicata principles to their own
custody decrees. See GoonRICH, CONFLICT OF LA.ws 422-23 (3d ed. 1949). Sampsell v.
Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 779, 197 P.2d 739, 750 (1948).
The finding of jurisdiction should be res judicata in other states if the defendant
participated in the initial proceedings. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Baldwin
v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). The jurisdictional finding
in a default decree is subject to attack in the enforcing state. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1878); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1874).
156
157
158
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Although a court with jurisdiction to modify a decree necessarily has a broad discretion, application of the full faith and creditres judicata principle in such proceedings gives the prevailing
parent the benefit of the previous findings, narrows the area of litigation, and imposes upon the petitioner the burden of proving a
change in circumstances sufficient to overturn the prior adjudication.
The Finality Problem
A half-century ago the Supreme Court decided that the full
faith and credit clause did not compel recognition and enforcement of prospectively modifiable foreign alimony decrees nor of
alimony accrued under retroactively modifiable decrees, because
they were not "final" judgments; only accrued installments not
subject to further change could command full faith and credit enforcement.160 But the chief consequence of the finality requirement
was evasion of support obligations, and in 1944 the Court indicated
in Barber v. Barber161 that the application of full faith and credit
to modifiable alimony decrees was still an open question, stating:
"[I]t is unnecessary to consider whether a decree or judgment
for alimony already accrued, which is subject to modification
or recall in the forum which granted it, but is not yet so modified, is entitled to full faith and credit until such time as it is
modified."
Justice Jackson, concurring, declared:
"[T]he judgment ... was entitled to faith and credit ... even
if it was not a final one. . . . Neither the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution nor the Act of Congress implementing it says anything about final judgments.... Both require
that full faith and credit be given to 'judicial proceedings'
without limitation as to finality.... If a later decree is made
which modifies or amends the judgment, that modification or
amendment will also be entiled to faith and credit...." 162
In none of the child custody cases, all decided after Barber, did
the Court determine whether lack of finality was an obstacle to full
160 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910); Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901); Barber
v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
161 323 U.S. 77, 81 (1944). The Court held that full faith and credit was due a presumably non-modifiable judgment for alimony accrued under a retroactively modifiable
decree.
162 323 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1944). See also Justice Rutledge dissenting in Griffin v.
Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 246-47 (1946). But cf. Rutledge concurring in Halvey v. Halvey,
330 U.S. 610, 620-21 (1947).
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faith and credit enforcement of custody decrees. Any definitive
statement as to the effect of the full faith and credit clause on such
decrees was studiously avoided in Halvey, Kovacs, and Ford. In
May the dissenters, by approving full faith and credit enforcement
in Ohio of the Wisconsin decree, necessarily rejected the finality
requirement; the plurality opinion may have tacitly done so to the
extent that it supported full faith and credit enforcement of custody decrees based on conventional "in personam" jurisdiction.
As suggested by Justice Jackson, finality is not a sensible
full faith and credit requirement. When a judgment is subject to
modification, it should be enforceable until modified. Present
rights are not ordinarily denied recognition because they may be altered by future judicial action. If a later modification occurs, new
rights will then supersede the old ones, but the possibility of such
an adjudication should not vitiate existing rights before they are
changed.163
The real issue raised by enforcement of modifiable judgments
is the fairness under due process standards of leaving a defendant
with a perhaps uncollectible claim for recoupment if he is required
to satisfy an obligation that is later judicially negated. Any unfairness, however, can be remedied without denying full faith and
credit to the judgment by permitting the defendant to assert his
modification claim in the enforcement proceedings, provided the
forum is a fair venue for litigating that issue.

Jurisdiction To Enforce v. Jurisdiction To Modify
Two years after undermining the finality doctrine in Barber
the Supreme Court held in Griffin v. Griffin164 that due process requires the defendant be given an opportunity to request modification during proceedings in the original forum to enforce collection of accrued but retroactively modifiable alimony installments.
The Court also suggested that the installments were enforceable by that procedure in other jurisdictions but did
163 When a plaintiff seeks to enforce a foreign judgment while an appeal is pending,
perhaps by asserting it as a cross claim in an action brought by the defendant in another
state, the most efficacious procedure is to stay the new proceedings until the appeal is
decided. Talk about finality largely obscures the problem. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 984
(1950); Note, 41 CoLUM. L. REv. 878 (1941). Likewise, if modification proceedings are
pending in the initial jurisdiction, a foreign court may stay the enforcement of a custody
decree to await the outcome. Even after appeal judgments may not be finally final
because subject to collateral attack but are generally enforceable subject to defenses
available in the initial forum. See 30A AM. JuR. Judgments §§ 935, 939 (1958); cf.
Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866); Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N.C. 482, 55
S.E. 371 (1906).
164 327 U.S. 220 (1945).
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not specify whether such enforcement is compelled by full faith
and credit.165 Thereafter the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
full faith and credit requires recognition and enforcement of prospectively modifiable foreign alimony decrees, 166 and the Supreme
Court of California declared such decrees, whether prospectively
or retroactively modifiable, enforceable on comity grounds provided claims for modification are first considered.167
The enforcing state is clearly a fair venue for litigating modification of a foreign alimony decree when both parties reside there.
It may, however, be unfair to require a nonresident plaintiff to
litigate modification where she finds the defaulting defendant, because that issue usually involves a far more extensive contest than
does enforcement of the decree. In such situations, upon plaintiff's
objection to the modification jurisdiction of the enforcing court,
perhaps that court should stay the proceedings until the defendant
has had a reasonable time in which to request modification in a
venue fair to plaintiff. 168 Litigating in another forum is, of course,
inconvenient for defendant, but a defendant in default under a
valid decree should not be able, by his act of default, to control
the modification venue to the prejudice of the plaintiff. The
burden should be his to seek modification in an appropriate forum
if he desires to change his duly adjudicated obligations.169
Griffin implies that authority to enforce a retroactively modifiable foreign alimony decree necessarily includes authority to
modify it. In Halvey and Kovacs the Supreme Court used language
suggesting the same rule applies to child custody decrees without
considering the differences between custody and alimony. Speaking
in terms of full faith and credit rather than due process the Court
stated in Halvey:
165 In a New York ex parte proceeding the plaintiff obtained a money judgment for
accrued alimony installments preliminary to execution. The Supreme Court held that
failure to give the defendant notice and an opportunity to request permissible modification violated due process, making the ex parte judgment unenforceable in the District
of Columbia, but suggested the accrued installments might be enforceable pursuant to
the original New York alimony decree if the defendant's claim for modification were
heard by the District of Columbia court.
106 Light v. Light, 12 III. 2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 35 (1957).
167 Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P .2d 19 (1955). See also UNIFORM
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT.

168 Since such a stay necessarily involves delay in enforcement of at least part of
the defendant's alimony obligation, plaintiff may choose not to object to the modification
jurisdiction of the enforcing court.
100 Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Griffin, referred to the possibility of abstention by the enforcing court pending modification in the initial jurisdiction. 327 U.S. 220,
250 (1946).
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"So far as full faith and credit is concerned, what Florida
could do in modifying the decree, New York may do.... It
· is clear that the state of the forum has at least as much leeway
to disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it
as does the State where it was rendered." 170
The protection that full faith and credit can afford child custody decrees is minimal if jurisdiction to modify such decrees automatically accompanies authority to enforce them. If a loser who
withholds the child may request modification of the decree when
the winner petitions to enforce it, application of the res judicata
principle does not so significantly inhibit abduction and repeated
litigation. While explicit redetermination of old issues is foreclosed, implicit reconsideration of the entire controversy may occur
in the guise of an evaluation of subsequent or previously unlitigated events. 171 Even if the res judicata policy were everywhere
scrupulously observed, the opportunity to seek modification in a
new jurisdiction by taking the child there would remain inviting.
Jurisdiction to modify a foreign custody decree is not a necessary concomitant of authority to enforce the decree. Jurisdiction
to modify is limited by due process requirements; those requirements, implementing the social objectives previously discussed,
indicate that the venue for modification should, whenever possible,
be at the child's established home. Although both parties are before
the enforcing court, it is not usually a convenient forum to the
prevailing parent for litigating the more complex issue of modification, and by initiating enforcement proceedings there that
parent ordinarily does not intend consent to its modification jurisdiction. Consent implies voluntary acceptance of the authority of
a court,172 and the plaintiff seeks only to enforce the decree in ac170 330 U.S. 610, 614 (1947). In Kovacs the Court stated: "Whatever effect the Full
Faith and Credit Clause may have with respect to custody decrees, it is clear, as the
Court stated in Halvey, 'that the State of the forum has at least as much leeway to
disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as does the State where it was
rendered.' " 356 U.S. 604, 607 (1958).
Despite their broad language, neither Halvey nor Kovacs definitively holds that an
enforcing state may always modify, in accordance with the law of the initial jurisdiction, a
foreign custody decree. The basic issue of due process jurisdiction to modify passed virtually unnoticed in both, and in Kovacs the enforcing and modifying state, where the
child had been living for over four years, was the established home. See text accompanying notes 26, 36 supra.
171 See Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 77 Atl. I (1910); EHRENZWEIG, CoNFUCT OF
LAws 283-84 (1959); Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Across State Lines, 10 LAw &:
CONTEMP, PROB, 819, 830 (1944).
172 See REsrATEMENT, CONFUCT OF LAws § 81 (1934).
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cordance with constitutional requirements, not to change it. 173
The full faith and credit clause need not authorize an enforcing
state to modify a decree when due process factors suggest that
determination should be made by another forum. 174
Due process does not require that the losing parent be allowed
to request modification during enforcement proceedings because,
in contrast to the alimony cases, the loser is not unfairly prejudiced
by a decree ordering the child returned to the winner pending a
request for modification in a more appropriate forum. A custody
decree is necessarily subject only to prospective modification; a
child cannot be removed retroactively from the possession of a
parent. Judicially compelled compliance with an existing decree
thus does not involve enforcement of rights which may later be invalidated. The prevailing parent is entitled to possession of the
child until the decree is modified. Enforcement without modification preserves the rights of the winner and works no unfair hardship on the loser, who is free to request modification in a court
having jurisdiction.175
The enforcing court retains authority to protect the child
against mistreatment or abuse, but authority to modify is not
needed to provide such protection. 176 Upon a substantial showing
by the defendant that the child may suffer serious harm if returned
to the prevailing parent, the court can stay the enforcement proceedings until the defendant has had a reasonable time in which
to petition for modification in a proper forum.
Perhaps, however, a plaintiff may be subjected to the modification jurisdiction of an enforcing state as a condition to initiating enforcement proceedings there. The Supreme Court said in
Adams v. Saenger:
"There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent a state from adopting a procedure by which a judgment
in personam may be rendered in a cross-action against a plain11a As to the authority of an enforcing state to require submission to its modification
jurisdiction as a condition of enforcement, see text accompanying notes 177-82 infra.
174 See text accompanying notes 91, 171 supra and note 182 infra. If, however, plaintiff does not object to litigating the modification issue in the enforcing court, the jurisdiction of that tribunal to modify, being soundly based upon consent, accords with
due process requirements.
175 See Crocker v. Crocker, 122 Colo. 49, 219 P.2d 311 (1950); French v. French, 182
Tenn. 606, 188 S.W.2d 603 (1945); Marthens v. Superior Court, 25 Wash. 2d 125, 169
P.2d 626 (1946); Jones v. McCloud, 19 Wash. 2d 314, 142 P.2d 397 (1943); In re Bums,
194 Wash. 293, 77 P.2d 1025 (1938); Motichka v. Rollands, 144 Wash. 565, 258 Pac. 333
(1927).
176 See note 88 supra.
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tiff in its courts, upon service of process or of appropriate
pleadings upon his attorney. The plaintiff having, by his
voluntary act in demanding justice from the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, there is nothing
arbitrary or unreasonable in treating him as being there for
all purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his
presence. It is the price which the state may exact as the condition of opening its courts to the plaintiff...." 177
This language recognizes a broad authority in each state to
subject a nonresident plaintiff to its jurisdiction on a cross-action
by the defendant, but the authority is not unlimited. Such a condition may be imposed upon the plaintiff "for all purposes for which
justice to the defendant requires his presence." If justice to the
defendant does not require that the cross-claim be then litigated,
the condition does not meet the A dams test.
In Adams plaintiff's unadjudicated claim for money was countered by defendant's unadjudicated claim for money. As in the
case of retroactively modifiable alimony, there is an element of unfairness in compelling a defendant to pay money without asserting
his cross-claim for money, because a later judgment on the crossclaim obtained at the plaintiff's residence may be then uncollectible.
Furthermore, the accessibility of the evidence is usually about the
same at either residence, and the forum is not likely to be more
inconvenient to plaintiff for litigating one claim than the other.
Even if the claims arise from different occurrences, there may well
be an overlapping of issues, and the account between the parties
can probably be settled in the one lawsuit. A requirement that offsetting monetary claims be litigated together, therefore, does justice
to the defendant and is not unfair to the plaintiff.178 On the other
hand, in custody disputes as previously pointed out, justice to the
losing parent seldom requires that modification be litigated in an
enforcing court while justice to the prevailing parent, as well as to
the child, often prescribes a different forum for the trial of that
issue.
A dams did not deal with a cross-claim in response to an action
on a valid foreign judgment. In such cases the plaintiff's claim is
reinforced by the duty of the forum to give full faith and credit to
the prior decision. A state may not avoid that constitutional man303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938).
If plaintiff is unable to prove his case after bringing the action, it is not unreasonable to permit an affirmative recovery by defendant on the cross complaint.
177
178
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date by limiting the jurisdiction of its courts,179 nor by any unreasonable condition.180 Necessarily, therefore, a state may subject
a nonresident plaintiff to a cross-claim by the defendant as a condition to the full faith and credit enforcement of a foreign judgment
only if the forum constitutes a fair venue for trial of defendant's
claim in accordance with due process requirements. Consequently,
unless custody decrees are in a less favored category, a prevailing
parent cannot be subjected to modification jurisdiction as a condition to enforcement of a valid custody decree when due process
considerations indicate the issue should be decided elsewhere.181
The policy of full faith and credit can operate effectively to
protect custody decrees if authority to enforce such decrees does
not imply jurisdiction to modify them.182 Valid decrees would then
be enforceable without change in every state except those having
modification jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction, if based on the established home concept, would provide a venue fair to both parties in
a court with optimum access to the relevant evidence, and adherKenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411 (1920).
See Union Nat'! Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38 (1949); Milwaukee County v. M. E.
Wbite Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935); Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928); Kentucky Finance
Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch., 262 U.S. 544 (1923); Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, supra
note 179; Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210
U.S. 230 (1908); cf. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). See also
First Nat'! Bank v. United Airlines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951).
181 Of doubtful present vitality is the anomalous case of York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15
(1890) upholding the Texas statutory rule that a defendant waives his due process objection
to the jurisdiction of the forum by appearing there specially to make the objection. See
also Western Life Indem. Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S. 261 (1914). See Blair, Constructive
General Appearance and Due Process, 23 ILL. L. REv. 119, 121-27 (1928); Hearon,
Non-Resident Defendants and the Special Appearance in Texas, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 78,
96-100 (1953); 5 UTAH L. REv. 406 (1957). The decision in effect compelled a nonresident
defendant sued in Texas to give up either his constitutional right to object to the due
process jurisdiction of the court or his constitutional right to contest on the merits.
See Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301, 304-05, 2 P.2d 756, 757 (1931). The
state was thus permitted to condition the exercise of one federal right on the waiver of
another. This curious result was justified on the ground that the entry of a default
judgment by a court without due process jurisdiction violates no constitutional rights of
the defendant. Only when enforcement of the judgment is sought are the defendant's
rights threatened and full protection is then available through a collateral attack on
jurisdictional grounds, thought the majority, thus assuming the success of the attack and
ignoring the loss of a defense on the merits. Overlooked was the effect of an unsatisfied
judgment on a defendant's business reputation, credit rating, opportunities for employment, and title to real property later acquired in the forum. See Blair, supra. The fair
solution is the rule adopted in the federal courts and many states permitting a defendant
to contest on the merits without waiving jurisdictional objections after they have been
urged and overruled. Fm. R. CIV. P. 12(b); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT § 237a; N.J. Sup. CT. R.
3:12-2; Preston v. Legard, 160 Va. 364, 168 S.E. 445 (1933); see Jardine v. Superior Court,
2U Cal. 301-05, 2 P.2d 756-58 (1931).
182 See text accompanying notes 91, 171, 174 supra.
179
180
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ence to the res judicata principle would foreclose redetermination
of previously decided issues.

Consideration of Prior Unadjudicated Events
The Supreme Court in Halvey and Kovacs carefully avoided
deciding whether the full faith and credit clause inhibits the modification of custody decrees on the basis of facts not admissible in
the initial jurisdicti9n. While modification may everywhere be
grounded upon events occurring subsequent to the decree, some
states, as heretofore indicated, also permit consideration of prior
but unlitigated events.183 When such prior events are no longer
admissible in the initial state, perhaps a modifying court whose
jurisdiction rests upon the established home principle should be
free to apply its own rule in the exercise of a broad authority to
safeguard the child's welfare. The policy of full faith and credit
ought to make the antecedent decree res judicata as to all litigated
issues but need not forestall evaluation of matters not previously
considered, whatever the rule in the first forum.
In Yarborough v. Yarborough 184 a seven-to-two majority of the
Supreme Court decided that a non-modifiable child support decree
was res judicata as to the extent of the father's support obligation
and that the state of the child's later residence could not impose
on the nonresident father an additional support obligation arising
from subsequent events. But whatever its soundness as to non-modifiable support decrees, the Yarborough holding does not control
the basis for revision of modifiable custody decrees. A judgment
that purports to be a final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties may foreclose all future litigation on the
matter, but the res judicata effect of a decree that is subject to later
change in other jurisdictions is less sweeping; the second forum
may be bound by the findings of the first but not necessarily by its
rules for modification.
The modifying court has the responsibility of allocating custody
in accordance with the present needs of the child. So long as that
court does not relitigate what has already been decided, there appears to be no constitutional reason why the admissibility of evidence pertinent to the performance of its difficult task should be
controlled by the prior forum. 185
supra.

188 See note 3
184 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
185 The substantive custody

rules of all the states rest upon general equitable principles relating to the welfare of the child and the natural desire of the parents to enjoy
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While the congressional full faith and credit statute requires
that a judgment receive the "same" faith and credit in every state
as in the state where rendered, 186 the effect of a judicial decision
cannot always be exactly the same in every state. A judgment that
"closes the doors" of the forum to a plaintiff without deciding the
merits of the claim will foreclose further action in the forum but
not in other jurisdictions. 187 Interpreted in the context of the constitutional policy against relitigation, the full faith and credit statute
can reasonably be construed as requiring a modifying court to
accept the decision of the prior jurisdiction but not its grounds
for modification.
POSTSCRIPT: THE PROBLEM OF CHILD SUPPORT

Common sense suggests that the extent of a father's obligation
for child support should be resolved at the time of the custody
adjudication, and most of the values heretofore discussed confirm
the established home principle as a sound basis for allocation of
authority to determine both issues. Application of that principle
will usually provide a forum for the trial of the support question
that is fair to both parties and free from the arbitrary control of
either. A mother left at home with the child can sue a departing
father in the home state for both custody and support; if the father
leaves with the child, she may seek such relief in that venue until the
its society and participate in its upbringing (see note 74 supra). However, the procedures
involved in making the custody determination are varied. See KEE=, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 715 (3d ed. 1946); Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 49 (1953); Lemkin, Orphans of Living Parents, a Comparative Legal and Sociological
View, 10 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 834 (1943); Comment, Ford v. Ford; Full Faith and
Credit to Child Custody Decrees, 73 YALE L.J. 134 (1963); Comment, Use of Extra Record
Information in Custody Cases, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 349 (1959). The most significant choice
of law problem concerns the consideration in modification proceedings of prior but unIitigated occurrences. (The issue may be posed as a conflict between the res judicata
policy of the initial forum, foreclosing future consideration of past events, and the authority of the modifying forum to define the basis for a subsequent change in custody.)
The established home state probably bears the primary responsibility for providing the
substantive rules to regulate the child's custody. Should there be a conflict between the
substantive custody rules of that state and a forum whose jurisdiction rests on consent,
the former ought to prevail, at least in the absence of an express legislative directive in
the forum as to the proper choice of law. But the forum has the primary responsibility for
making a correct adjudication on the basis of the applicable substantive rules and should
not be restricted in its consideration of evidence that is unadjudicated and unprivileged.
As to the significance of comparative state interest in allocating jurisdiction, rather
than choosing the appropriate rules of decision, see notes 87, 115 supra.
28 u.s.c. § 1738 (1958).
For example, a judgment for defendant based upon the statute of limitations or a
special procedural rule of the forum. See Warner v. Buffalo Drydock Co., 67 F.2d 540
(2d Cir. 1933).
186
187
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child acquires an established home elsewhere. A mother who departs with the child must proceed in the state that she left to obtain
custody and support from the father until a new established home
exists, and within that time the father may request the same forum
to determine his custody rights and support obligations.188 Such a
venue will usually provide maximum access to evidence relating
to the needs of the child and the financial capacity of the resident
parent, although evidence concerning the resources of the nonresident parent may in some cases be more readily available in another
forum. 189
The Pennoyer v. Neff doctrine,190 that authority to issue a
money judgment depends upon the "presence" of the defendant
or his property, has been apparently confirmed by the Supreme
Court as the constitutional test for alimony jurisdiction in language
broad enough to encompass child support litigation.191 But an
188 In addition, a defendant may consent to jurisdiction by appearing without objec•
tion, and a plaintiff may elect to proceed at the defendant's residence. See text accom•
panying notes 117-19 supra. In lieu of venue in an established home state the alternatives
heretofore discussed are applicable. See text accompanying notes ll!l-16 supra.
189 Cf. text accompanying notes 103-06 supra. In most cases the established home prin•
ciple probably facilitates the litigation of divorce, custody, and child support in the same
forum. Usually a stay-at-home parent has lived in the home state long enough to petition
there for divorce, as well as for a determination of custody and child support, before the
child has acquired a new established home with the departing parent. In the absence of
such proceedings by the stay-at-home parent, the departing parent can probably petition
for divorce, custody, and child support in the same forum after satisfying the required
period of residence for divorce, which in most states is at least six months. When a de•
parting parent petitions for divorce within six months in a state having a short residence
requirement, the forum will usually lack jurisdiction to adjudicate either custody or child
support in the absence of a voluntary appearance by the stay-at-home parent, but such a
default divorce is of questionable validity if the plaintiff leaves the forum shortly after
the decree. See Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226 (1945). A court with jurisdiction to adjudicate divorce, custody, and child support
could reasonably be considered an appropriate forum for the litigation of alimony, as
well. Of course, either parent may wish to sue for custody and/or a determination of
child support, but not divorce, and variations in grounds and residence requirements for
divorce will often inhibit litigation of all issues in the same forum.
190 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
191 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555
(1948); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup•
port Act, designed to facilitate collection of child support from deserting fathers, rests
upon this premise; it permits a support adjudication against a father only where he or his
property is "present." The result is a cumbersome, bifurcated proceeding for the determination of initial child support: a complaint filed by the mother in the initiating state,
where she and the child reside, is forwarded to a court of the responding state, where the
father resides, which determines the custody obligation after considering his evidence and
a transcipt of the mother's testimony also forwarded by the initiating state. See UNIFORM
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 9; CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD &: REEsE,
CONFLICT OF LAws 849 (1957). The procedures of the act are perhaps more useful in enforcing existing decrees against departed fathers. Enforcement by execution or contempt
citation generally requires a judgment of the state where the defendant or his property is
located, but such a judgment need not readjudicate the substantive support issues.
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adjudication by the established home state of a nonresident father's
support obligation would not appear to be more offensive to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" than a custody
determination. 192 Not only does an absent father have a "minimum
contact" with the state where his child habitually resides, but his
failure to support the child may well constitute a kind of tortious
activity sufficiently carried on in that state to make it a fair venue
for enforcing the obligation.193
Jurisdiction to modify a child support decree involves additional considerations. A father should petition for reduced support
in the state where the child has an established home with the
mother, but a mother who may petition in that state for increased
support can subject a nonresident father to frequent litigation
in an inconvenient forum. The importance of inhibiting repeated
litigation and of providing a fair venue for the father may justify
the allocation of jurisdiction to the state of his residence when the
mother requests such modification. 194
When the mother sues at the father's residence to collect support payments accrued under a retroactively modifiable decree, due
process requires that the father be heard on the modification issue
before payment is enforced, 195 but due process does not require
that a defaulting father be allowed to compel litigation of this
issue in a forum of his choosing.196 Upon objection to its modification jurisdiction by a nonresident mother, the enforcing court can
stay the proceedings until the father has had sufficient time to request modification in a venue fair to her. 197 If she has also petitioned for enforcement of prospective support payments as they
supra.
F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1958); Atkinson v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d
673 (1957); EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 171, at 264-65 n.9. The significant differences
in the substantive rules of the various states concerning the parental obligation to support a legitimate minor child relate to the age at which the obligation terminates and the
extent to which the mother shares the obligation with the father. See Commissioner's
Prefatory Note, UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9C UNIFORM LAws
.ANNOTATED 10-11 (1957). Because of its interest in the maintenance of the child, the established home state may reasonably control these limitations, although the presence of
other dependents at the father's residence increases the interest of that state in the apportionment of his income. Cf. note 185 supra. As to the significance of comparative state
interest in allocating jurisdiction, see notes 87, 115 supra.
104 As to modification (a) before creation of an established home, see text accompanying notes 124-28 supra, (b) after creation of an established home, see text accompanying
notes 120-23, 129-31 supra, (c) when custody is divided, see text accompanying notes
132-33 supra.
lOll See text accompanying note 164 supra.
106 See text accompanying notes 168, 177-81 supra.
197 See note 168 supra.
102 See text accompanying notes 148-51
10s Ibid.; see WSAZ Inc. v. Lyons, 254
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accrue, the enforcing court may order reasonable support pending
final determination of the modification issue.
THE FUNCTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

IN Ar.LOCATING ] URISDICTION

The foregoing discussion suggests that in order to develop
workable rules for the allocation of child custody jurisdiction
the Supreme Court must articulate the values to be implemented
by such allocation and apply to each situation principles derived
from those values. Substantive common-law rules are developed
by a similar process, but values, principles, and rules formulated
by the Supreme Court in defining state judicial authority and the
extraterritorial effect of judgments must be consistent with the
constitutional text.
Obviously, the Court can give meaning to the phrases "due
process of law" and "full faith and credit" only by identifying
the values it considers implicit in the language. The broad policies
of fundamental fairness and national unity suggested by these
clauses become functional guides for allocation of jurisdiction when
translated in terms of the well-being of the persons affected by the
litigation, the convenience of the venue, the accessibility of the
evidence, the consequences of repeated litigation, the reasonable
expectations of litigants, and the importance of interstate cooperation and respect. As stated by Justice Rutledge, concurring in
Halvey,1 98 " • • • the controlling consideration should be the best
interests of the child, not only for disposing of such cases as a matter
of local policy ... but also for formulating federal policies of full
faith and credit as well as of jurisdiction and due process in relation
to such dispositions ...."
APPENDIX

A Restatement of Rules for Custody Jurisdiction Derived
From the Established Home Principle
(I) Jurisdiction to make an initial decree regulating the custody of a
child may be exercised by the state where the child's established home
is located at the time proceedings are begun, provided the child or one of
the parties claiming custody resides there.
(2) A child has an established home at the last place where it resided for
at least six months with a parent or a person acting as a parent.
(3) If the child has no established home, or if neither the child nor any
198

330 U.S. 610, 620 (1947).
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person claiming custody resides in the established home state when proceedings are brought, initial custody jurisdiction may be exercised by the state
where the child's last non-transient abode with both parents is located,
provided the child or one of the parties claiming custody resides there; if
they do not, initial custody jurisdiction may be exercised by the state
where the child resides with a parent, or a person acting as parent,199 at
the time the proceedings are begun.
(4) Jurisdiction to modify a custody decree may be exercised by the
state that issued it until the child acquires an established home elsewhere,
provided the child or the prevailing parent resides there, or the non-prevailing parent resides there and the prevailing parent has removed the child
to another state without express court authorization.
(5) Pending the acquisition of an established home, jurisdiction to
modify a custody decree may be exercised by the state to which the prevailing parent has taken the child after the decree if the move was expressly
authorized by the court or if the non-prevailing parent does not reside in
the state of the decree. After the prevailing parent has moved the child first
to an authorized state and then to an unauthorized state, but before the
creation of an established home, the authorized state may exercise modification jurisdiction if the non-prevailing parent resides there, and the state of
the decree may exercise jurisdiction if the non-prevailing parent resides
there; otherwise the unauthorized state may exercise jurisdiction.
(6) Jurisdiction to modify a custody decree may be exercised by the state
where the last established home acquired by the child subsequent to
the decree is located, provided the child or a party claiming custody resides
there.
(7) If each parent is given custody for a part of the year by decree or
agreement, the child may acquire an established home with the parent
having the shorter period of custody by continuing to live in the same place
with that parent for three months after the end of the shorter period, and
for a total of at least six months, without action by the other parent. If
each parent is given custody for approximately half the year by decree or
agreement, jurisdiction to modify the decree or to make an initial disposition should be exercised by the state in which the child has been residing
with the petitioning parent for at least nine months without action by the
defending parent.
(8) If the non-prevailing parent removes a child in violation of the
decree and the prevailing parent cannot locate them in time to prevent
the creation of an established home in a second state, upon a petition to
enforce the decree that state should return the child to the prevailing parent
without considering modification if, under the circumstances, the prior
home state remains a fair venue for litigating the issue.
100

See note 102 supra and note 200 infra.
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(9) If neither parent nor the child200 resides in the established home
state when modification proceedings are begun, jurisdiction to modify may
be exercised by the state where the last non-transient abode of the child
and the prevailing parent is located, provided the child or the prevailing
parent resides there; if they do not, modification jurisdiction may be exercised by the state where the child then resides.201
(10) Jurisdiction to make or modify a custody decree may be exercised
by a state with the consent of the parties claiming custody or by a state
in which the child resides with one of the persons claiming custody when
proceedings are initiated there by the nonresident claimant.
(11) No state may exercise jurisdiction to make or modify a custody
decree if a prior action is pending in a court with jurisdiction.
(12) A valid custody decree is entitled to full faith and credit enforcement
in every state. An enforcing court has jurisdiction to modify the decree at
the request of the defendant only if the above-stated requirements for
modification jurisdiction are met.
(13) A modifying court is required by the full faith and credit clause to
accept the prior decree as res judicata on all previously adjudicated issues
but may decide for itself whether to consider evidence of events occurring
before the decree but not presented to the initial court, as well as evidence
of subsequent events.
(14) The state where a child is physically present may remove the
child from the possession of any person who is mistreating or abusing it.
If, in proceedings to enforce a foreign custody decree, the defendant makes
a substantial showing that the child may suffer serious harm if returned to
the plaintiff, the court may stay the proceedings until the defendant has
had a reasonable time in which to petition for modification in a court with
jurisdiction.
Application of Rules to Typical Situations
In every situation it is assumed that: (1) the defendant has received
fair notice, (2) a state has jurisdiction when one parent petitions there for
custody and the other is a resident or appears wihout objecting to the
jurisdiction, (3) a state does not have jurisdiction if a prior action is pending in a foreign court with jurisdiction.
Case A
After the parents have lived with the child for more than six months in
state X, one parent removes the child to state Y:
(I) Until the child has lived in Y for six months, X has jurisdiction to
determine custody.
200 The child's residence may be with a person acting as parent if neither parent
maintains a residence for the child.
201 This residence may be with the losing parent.
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(2) Y has jurisdiction to determine custody if: (a) the child has lived
there for at least six months, or (b) the stay-at-home parent has left X.
Case B

After the parents have lived with the child for more than six months in
state W and then for two months in state X, one parent removes the child
to state Y:
(1) Until the child has lived in Y for six months, X has jurisdiction to
determine custody provided the stay-at-home parent resides there.
(2) Y has jurisdiction to determine custody if (a) the child has lived
there for at least six months, or (b) the stay-at-home parent has left X but
has not returned to W.
(3) Until the child has lived in Y for six months W has jurisdiction to
determine custody if the stay-at-home parent has returned there.
Case C

After the parents have lived with the child for more than six months
in state X and then for two months in state Y, one parent returns with the
child to state X:
(1) X has jurisdiction to determine custody.
Case D

One parent removes the child from its home in state X to state Y and
permits the child to live for extended periods in a boarding school or with
relatives in state Z:
(1) Y has jurisdiction to determine custody after six months or after the
stay-at-home parent has left X if the child regularly returns to the residence
of the parent in Y.
(2) If the parent in Y does not maintain a residence for the child but
permits the child to remain indefinitely at the school or with the relatives,
Z has jurisdiction after six months or after the stay-at-home parent has left

X.
(3) Until the child has lived in Y or Z for six months, X has jurisdiction
to determine custody provided the stay-at-home parent resides there.
Case E

The losing parent, in violation of a valid custody decree of state X,
removes the child from state X to state Y. The winner brings habeas corpus
proceedings in Y to enforce the decree. The loser then requests modification on the basis of events occurring after the decree and events occurring
before the decree but not presented to the court because previously unknown. In X modification may not be based on prior events.
(1) Y should give full faith and credit to the X decree by enforcing it
without relitigating any issues.

844

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

(2) Y has jurisdiction to modify the decree if the child has lived there
for six months. In that event Y may decide for itself whether to consider
the previously unadjudicated events.
(3) Until the child has lived in Y for six months, X has jurisdiction to
modify the decree provided the winner still resides there.
(4) Upon a substantial showing by the loser that the child may suffer
serious harm if returned to the winner, Y, if it lacks jurisdiction to modify,
may stay the enforcement proceedings until the loser has had a reasonable
time in which to petition for modification in X.
Case F

Shortly after a valid custody decree in state X, the winner takes the
child to state Y and three months later to state Z:
(1) X has jurisdiction to modify until the child has lived in Z for six
months provided the loser lives in X and the moves to Y and Z were without
court authorization.
(2) Y has jurisdiction to modify until the child has lived in Z for six
months provided the loser lives in Y, the move to Y was authorized, and the
move to Z was not authorized.
(3) Z has jurisdiction to modify if the move to Z was authorized or the
child has lived there for six months or the loser no longer lives in X, nor in
Y if the move to Y was authorized.
Case G

After a valid custody decree in state W, the winner takes the child to
state X for over six months and then to state Y for three months. The child
then visits the loser in state Z and is retained there in violation of the
decree. After three months the winner brings habeas corpus proceedings
in Z and the loser requests modification:
(I) Z has jurisdiction to modify if the winner no longer resides in X or Y.
(2) Y has jurisdiction to modify if the winner still resides there.
(3) X has jurisdiction to modify if the winner now resides there.
Case H

A valid decree of state X gives the mother custody in X for eight months
of the year and the father custody in Y for four months. After the father
has retained the child in Y for a total of seven months, he requests and
obtains a modification in Y, over the mother's objection to the jurisdiction,
giving each parent custody for half the year. After the mother has retained
the child in X for seven months the father brings habeas corpus proceedings there. The mother claims the modification was made without jurisdiction and also asks further modification.
(1) Y had jurisdiction to modify, and the Y decree is entitled to full
faith and credit enforcement in X.
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(2) X has no jurisdiction to modify except at the request of the father.
Y has jurisdiction to modify at the request of the mother.

Application to Supreme Court Cases
Had these rules been applied in the Supreme Court cases previously
discussed, the results would have been as follows:
In May v. Anderson,202 Wisconsin, the long-established family home,
had jurisdiction to award custody of the children to the stay-at-home father
who petitioned promptly after the mother had removed them to Ohio. Ohio
properly gave full faith and credit to the Wisconsin decree and ordered the
children returned to the father when the mother retained them in Ohio in
violation of the decree. Since the established home of the children after the
decree remained in Wisconsin, Ohio did not have jurisdiction to modify the
decree in the enforcement proceedings had it offered a procedure for doing
so.
In Halvey v. Halvey,203 Florida was the established home and had initial
custody jurisdiction, because the child had been living there with its mother
for almost a year when she petitioned for custody. Service on the father,
however, was by "publication"; 204 unless such service included delivery of
notice to him or to his home, it violated due process requirements for fair
notice and the Florida custody decree was invalid. New York lacked jurisdiction to make or modify a custody decree, because when the father
retook the child, its established home was still in Florida where the mother
continued to reside. I£ the father did receive £air notice of the Florida
proceedings, New York should have given full faith and credit to the Florida
decree without modification and ordered the child returned to the mother.
I£ the father did not receive £air notice, New York should have declared the
decree invalid, but might then have proceeded to determine custody if the
mother thereupon requested such an adjudication.
In Kovacs v. Brewer,205 New York did not per se have jurisdiction to
modify, in favor of the mother, its prior decree, because the child's established home was in North Carolina at the time of the request for modification, but the father and grandfather consented to New York's jurisdiction
by contesting without objection to it. The child reacquired an established
home in North Carolina after the modification by living there another
fourteen months before the mother petitioned for enforcement. That state
therefore had jurisdiction to modify on the basis of both subsequent events
and prior, unlitigated events but could not redetermine £acts previously
adjudicated. Since evidence of previously litigated as well as of subsequent
events had been introduced at the hearing, a remand was necessary to per202
203
204
2011

See note 43 supra.
See note 26 supra.
The opinion does not elucidate this term.
See note 36 supra.
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mit a resolution of the modification issue by the North Carolina court solely
on the basis of the subsequent events.
In Ford v. Ford206 the full faith and credit clause did not require South
Carolina to accept as a binding custody decision the Virginia dismissal
order based on an agreement of the parents favoring the father, because the
order had decided nothing and was not res judicata under Virginia law.
The stay-at-home father, however, apparently continued to maintain an
established home in North Carolina for the children, who had been taken to
South Carolina by their mother during the summer, and he could have
soundly objected to the jurisdiction of the South Carolina court. Instead
he chose to litigate on the merits and was therefore bound by the decree.
206

See note 39 supra.

